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THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE, STATE ACTION,
AND TOWN OF GREECE
Nathan S. Chapman*
The Establishment Clause forbids the government from engaging in the same
religious exercise that the law protects when performed by a private party. Thus, an
establishment case often turns on whether religious activity is “state action.” Too
often, however, courts ignore the state action analysis or merge it with the substantive
Establishment Clause analysis. This muddles both doctrines and threatens individual
religious liberty.
This Article argues that the state action doctrine should account for the govern-
ment’s distribution of private rights. Accordingly, the Constitution applies to the
government’s distribution of rights, but not to a private party’s use of those rights.
This account of state action sharpens the substantive constitutional question in a
variety of constitutional contexts, but it is an especially powerful tool in religious lib-
erty cases. For instance, in Town of Greece v. Galloway the Court focused on whether
the prayers offered by chaplains before town meetings ran afoul of the Establishment
Clause because either they were too “sectarian” or the setting was too coercive. The
distribution principle, however, demands a more precise attribution of responsibility.
Greece was responsible for hosting prayers and choosing chaplains. By contrast, the
chaplains were responsible for the content of their prayers. The content of any given
prayer—including whether it was too “sectarian”—should not have been attributed to
the government. A better factual description of what occurred is this: Greece distrib-
uted the right to offer a ceremonial prayer. The proper constitutional analysis, there-
fore, would focus on whether that distribution comported with the Establishment,
Speech, and Free Exercise Clauses.
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 406
I. DISTRIBUTIONS OF RIGHTS AS STATE ACTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412
A. The Classical Model of State Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412
B. The Realist Critique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415
C. A Refined Account of the State Action Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419
1. A Defense of the Classical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419
2. The Government’s Distributions of Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 421
3. Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Georgia. I am grateful for feedback from the
participants at the 2014 Annual Law and Religion Conference at Washington University in St.
Louis, the 2014 Georgia Juniors Workshop, and the 2014 Georgia/Emory Faculty Workshop.
Special thanks to Will Baude, Ash Bhagwat, Randy Beck, Sam Bray, Jud Campbell, Kenny
Ching, Dan Coenen, Marc DeGirolami, Rick Garnett, Brian Lea, Jeff Powell, Zach Price,
Usha Rodrigues, Steve Smith, James Stern, Mark Tushnet, and Mike Wells.
405
406 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 24:405
II. PRIVATE CHOICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 428
A. The “Private Choice” Test in School Aid Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 429
B. Rethinking Zelman and State Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 430
1. Two Ways to Misconceive the State Action Question . . . . . . . . . 431
2. The Distribution of Educational Liberty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 433
3. The Substantive Question: Impermissible Incentives? . . . . . . . . . 434
III. RELIGIOUS SPEECH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 436
A. Town of Greece . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437
B. Whose Speech, Which Speaker? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 440
C. Ceremonial Public Prayer as a Very Limited Public Forum . . . . . . . 443
D. The Remaining Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 446
1. Religious Affirmative Action? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 446
2. A Duty of Supplemental Speech? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 447
IV. RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION STATUTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 448
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 450
INTRODUCTION
Establishment Clause cases often turn on a question the Supreme Court usually
ignores: Is the religious exercise at issue attributable to the government or to a pri-
vate party? The requirement of “state action,” which the Constitution applies only to
government conduct,1 is especially important in cases involving religious exercise.
“Precisely the same conduct—leading prayers, for example—is constitutionally valued
and protected if engaged in by private parties, though unconstitutional if done by the
government.”2
When religious exercise results from cooperation between the government and
a private party, allocating responsibility can be challenging. Rather than asking which
party is responsible for the religious exercise before applying substantive constitu-
tional law, courts and theorists too often merge the issue with an Establishment Clause
analysis.3 This muddies the substantive constitutional questions and unnecessarily
jeopardizes the rights of private parties.4
1 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11–12 (1883); see also Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149, 164–66 (1978) (asserting an “essential dichotomy” between public and private
action (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1994))).
2 Michael W. McConnell, State Action and the Supreme Court’s Emerging Consensus
on the Line Between Establishment and Private Religious Expression, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 681,
682 (2001) (emphasis omitted).
3 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 648–63 (2002) (merging the re-
sponsibility question into an Establishment Clause analysis of private school vouchers); see
Developments in the Law—State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 1248, 1279 (2010) [hereinafter State Action and the Public/Private Distinction] (arguing
that the state action doctrine should replace most of the Lemon test); McConnell, supra note
2, at 682 (arguing that “emerging Establishment Clause jurisprudence can be seen as a special-
ized application of the state action doctrine”).
4 See, for example, the sources cited supra note 3.
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For instance, in Town of Greece v. Galloway,5 the Court failed to allocate respon-
sibility between the town board and the individual chaplains who offered “sectarian”
prayers at the start of town board meetings.6 If the town was fully responsible for the
prayers, then the decision is in tension with “[t]he clearest command of the Estab-
lishment Clause”—“that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred
over another.”7 If the chaplains were responsible for their own prayers, on the other
hand, then the First Amendment may protect their speech.8 And if so, much of the
Court’s analysis—including the dissenting Justices’s concerns about sectarian speech
making religiously unaffiliated townspeople feel like outsiders—was constitutionally
irrelevant.9
Similarly, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,10 scholars argued that grant-
ing a religious accommodation to a for-profit corporation would violate the Estab-
lishment Clause by imposing burdens on the company’s employees.11 But those
scholars, and the cases on which they relied,12 do not explain how the government
5 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
6 Id. at 1820–24.
7 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512
U.S. 687, 696 (1994) (“‘A proper respect for . . . the Establishment Clause[ ] compels the
State to pursue a course of “neutrality” toward religion,’ favoring neither one religion over
others nor religious adherents collectively over nonadherents.” (citation omitted) (quoting
Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792–93 (1973))).
8 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845–46 (1995)
(holding that student publications were not the speech of the University of Virginia and thus
had First Amendment protections); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.,
508 U.S. 384, 392–97 (1993) (holding that religious film shown by church at a public school
was not speech of the school and thus had First Amendment protections).
9 See infra Part III.
10 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
11 See Brief for Amici Curiae Church-State Scholars Frederick Mark Gedicks et al. in
Support of the Government at 7–26, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014) (Nos. 13-354, 13-356); see also Frederick Mark Gedicks & Andrew Koppelman, Invisible
Women: Why an Exemption for Hobby Lobby Would Violate the Establishment Clause, 67
VAND. L. REV. 51, 53 (2014); Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA
Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion,
49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343, 372–84 (2014); Nelson Tebbe, Richard Schragger & Micah
Schwartzman, Hobby Lobby and the Establishment Clause, Part II: What Counts as a Burden
on Employees?, BALKINIZATION (Dec. 4, 2013, 6:04 PM), http://www.balkin.blogspot.com
/2013/12/hobby-lobby-and-establishment-clause.html [http://perma.cc/5E59-L2GU]. Several
prominent media outlets likewise advanced this theory. See, e.g., Editorial, A Missing Argument
on Contraceptives, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2014, at A22. In Hobby Lobby, I was counsel of record
on an amicus brief for constitutional law scholars arguing that an accommodation for the plain-
tiffs would not violate the Establishment Clause. See Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars
as Amici Curiae in Support of Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Woods, et al., Hobby Lobby, 134
S. Ct. 2751 (Nos. 13-354; 13-356). The arguments in this Article are mine, not my clients’.
12 See, e.g., Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (invalidating a tax exemption
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could be constitutionally responsible for the results of a private party’s exercise of
religion.13
These and other Establishment Clause puzzles lack an account of state action
that applies the Constitution to the government’s distribution of rights, but not to the
exercise of those rights by private parties. Despite seas of ink spilled over the state
action doctrine,14 the literature is surprisingly silent about how courts should analyze
the government’s distribution of rights. The Legal Realists of the early twentieth cen-
tury rightly criticized the classical state action doctrine’s facile distinction between
public and private; every private right, they argued, is shaped and enforced by govern-
ment power.15 The Supreme Court, for its part, has not done the doctrine any favors.
Sometimes, it seems, the government is constitutionally responsible for private race
discrimination; other times it is not.16 Between the Legal Realists’s powerful con-
ceptual critique and the Supreme Court’s inconsistency, commentators have largely
concluded that the state action doctrine is incoherent.17 The doctrine has few defend-
ers. Some have suggested it is useful as a “prudent” smokescreen for judicial activ-
ism,”18 and many others have suggested reforming it to more accurately account for
what the Court seems to be doing in “state action” cases—merging unstated consti-
tutional values with a responsibility analysis.19
Recently, though, a handful of scholars have defended the doctrine on the ground
that the Constitution was uniquely designed and is widely understood to constrain
the government as the people’s agent.20 This justification suggests that courts and
for religious periodicals); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (invalidating
a law forcing corporations to allow employees to take off on the Sabbath).
13 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
14 See, e.g., Larry Alexander, The Public/Private Distinction and Constitutional Limits on
Private Power, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 361, 361–63 (1993); Charles L. Black, Jr., “State Action,”
Equal Protection, and California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 70–71 (1967);
Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 1296–302 (1982); William P. Marshall, Diluting Constitutional Rights:
Rethinking “Rethinking State Action,” 80 NW. U. L. REV. 558, 558–60 (1985); Gary Peller
& Mark Tushnet, State Action and a New Birth of Freedom, 92 GEO. L.J. 779, 817 (2004);
William W. Van Alstyne & Kenneth L. Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3, 7 (1961).
15 See infra Part I.B.
16 Compare Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (invalidating private racially restric-
tive covenant), with Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (sustaining a state
liquor license law that permitted licensees to discriminate on the basis of race).
17 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 506
(1985) (“I contend that by any theory of rights—natural law, positivism, or consensus—the
state action requirement makes no sense.”); Michael J. Phillips, The Inevitable Incoherence
of Modern State Action Doctrine, 28 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 683 (1984).
18 Mark Tushnet, Shelley v. Kraemer and Theories of Equality, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
383, 406–08 (1988).
19 See, e.g., Robert J. Glennon, Jr. & John E. Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Four-
teenth Amendment “State Action” Requirement, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 221, 259–61.
20 Lillian BeVier & John Harrison, The State Action Principle and Its Critics, 96 VA. L.
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commentators should more carefully apply principles of agency to distinguish between
government and private conduct, since those principles are the very justification for
the Constitution’s application to the former, and not to the latter. By directing at-
tention to whether the government or a private party is responsible for a particular act,
the constitutional agency approach to state action, though promising, has the potential
to obscure the Realist insight that the government is responsible not only for the acts
of its agents, but also for the background distributions of rights that permit and con-
fine private action.
This Article suggests an account of state action that incorporates the insights of the
Realists and of those who defend the doctrine on grounds of constitutional agency.21
It argues that the Constitution applies not only to each governmental act—each stat-
ute, rule, judicial decision, prosecution, and the like—but also to the government’s
distribution of background rights to private parties. What the government is not re-
sponsible for is the way private parties use those rights in their own interest. Call
this the “distribution principle.”
The principle says nothing about whether any given distribution of rights would
violate the Constitution. Instead, by clarifying the action for which the government
is responsible, the distribution principle brings the proper substantive constitutional
questions into focus, allowing a more precise and productive debate about the range
of possible answers to those questions.
The principle clarifies the relevant state conduct—and therefore the substantive
constitutional holding—in some of the most befuddling cases. For instance, the
conventional view of Shelley v. Kraemer22 is that the case stands for the proposition
that the Equal Protection Clause forbids enforcing private racially restrictive covenants.
This view merges the private action at issue (racially restrictive covenants) and the
state action (enforcement).23 Instead, in light of the distribution principle, the best
reading of Shelley is: (1) the state common law, by which the state distributed rights
to enter into racially restrictive covenants, was state action; and (2) the Equal
Protection Clause forbids states from allowing private parties to enter into racially
restrictive covenants.24 Put inversely, the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to
forbid private racially restrictive covenants. The difference between this account and
the conventional one is more than grammatical: it clarifies that the government is
responsible for distributing rights, not for the actions of private parties, and thereby
REV. 1767, 1772–73 (2010); Christian Turner, State Action Problems, 65 FLA. L. REV. 281,
285–86 (2013).
21 For accounts similar to those offered in this Article, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL
CONSTITUTION 159–61 (1993), and Henry J. Friendly, The Public-Private Penumbra—
Fourteen Years Later, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289, 1295 (1982).
22 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
23 Id. at 14; see Tushnet, supra note 18, at 383 (noting that the view that the state action and
equal protection holdings are “identical” is “completely conventional among the commen-
tators on Shelley”).
24 See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20–22.
410 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 24:405
clarifies the substantive holding of the case.25 Debate about whether Shelley was
rightly decided should attend to whether the Equal Protection Clause is persuasively
read to require states to forbid certain private conduct, rather than whether the
Fourteenth Amendment applies to private conduct and, if so, when.26
Though the distribution principle promises to reshape cases across the constitu-
tional spectrum, it is an especially important tool in religious liberty cases. Distin-
guishing between distributions of liberty and private religious exercise is crucial
both for developing coherent and clear Establishment Clause doctrine and for pro-
tecting private religious freedom. This Article illustrates the implication of the distribu-
tion principle in Establishment Clause cases by considering how it redefines the
substantive constitutional questions arising from the school voucher program in Zelman
v. Simmons-Harris,27 the legislative prayers in Town of Greece v. Galloway,28 and
religious accommodation statutes like the one at issue in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc.29
In Zelman, the Court merged the state action and establishment analyses, holding
that a religiously neutral voucher program of “true private choice” is constitutional.30
Instead, the Court should have analyzed the voucher program as a distribution of
liberty. Parents have a constitutional right to choose the manner of their child’s edu-
cation.31 No one claimed that the parents were being coerced to use their vouchers
on religious schools.32 They were exercising choice. That choice was not attributable
to the government. The distribution of options, however, was attributable to the
government. The constitutional question, then, was whether the government’s distribu-
tion of educational options violated the Establishment Clause. The only way the pro-
gram could have violated the Establishment Clause, I suggest, would be if it created
incentives to choose one school over another that unduly burden a parent’s constitu-
tional right to direct a child’s education. The difficult constitutional questions,
therefore, are familiar from the Court’s doctrine governing the right to an abortion:
(1) what government action is relevant to determining the incentives and burdens
placed upon the exercise of a constitutional right; and (2) what counts as an undue
25 Id.
26 See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991) (holding under
this view that the government may not permit a party to exclude jurors solely on the basis of
race); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961) (holding under this view
that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits government contracts with racially discriminatory
public accommodations).
27 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
28 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
29 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
30 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 648–49.
31 See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399–400 (1923).
32 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 648–49.
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burden.33 Regardless of the answers to these questions, separating the government
conduct from the private conduct recasts the substantive constitutional questions,
showing that they are as much about the individual rights of parents as they are
about the government’s impermissible advancement of religion.34
In Town of Greece, the Court failed to come to terms with who was responsible
for the chaplain’s speech, focusing instead on whether the practice was too “coercive”
or the speech too “sectarian.”35 Both questions were beside the point. Greece exer-
cised no control over the content of each invocation—the chaplain was responsible
for that.36 The government was responsible, however, for distributing the right to
offer a ceremonial invocation, both in choosing to host an invocation and in choos-
ing who would offer one.37 As in Zelman, properly distinguishing the conduct for
which the government was responsible and the conduct for which the private parties
were responsible suggests that the case presented not only interesting Establishment
Clause questions, but also questions about the scope of individual rights of speech
and religious exercise.38
By contrast, religious accommodation cases present a relatively simple state
action analysis. The government is responsible both for the law that allegedly burdens
religious exercise and the accommodation from that law. The government is not
constitutionally responsible for whether and how a private actor chooses to exercise
a right. The constitutional question, then, is whether the Establishment Clause
prohibits an accommodation because of the private religious exercise it permits.
Given the tension between the Supreme Court cases that bear on the question, Kent
Greenawalt has described this issue as “[a]mong the most vexed . . . in the law of the
religion clauses.”39 This Article, therefore, can do little more than suggest this state
action analysis as a starting point for developing a “tenable theory . . . for drawing
the line between permissible accommodation and impermissible establishment.”40
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I argues for a reformation of the state
action doctrine to incorporate the insight, prompted by the Legal Realists, that the
33 See generally Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (“Only
where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to [decide to procure
an abortion] does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause.”).
34 See Freedom from Religion Found. v. McCallum, 324 F.3d 880, 882 (7th Cir. 2003)
(upholding a program that allowed prisoners to choose a halfway house, among others, that
taught Christianity); see also Alexander Volokh, Prison Vouchers, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 779,
790–91 (2012).
35 See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1819–20 (2014).
36 Id. at 1816.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIR-
NESS 336 (2008).
40 Id.
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Constitution applies to the government’s distribution of rights, but not to the exer-
cise of those rights by private parties. Part II suggests that this understanding clari-
fies the Establishment Clause questions arising from the government’s distribution
of school vouchers. Part III does the same for religious speech by examining the
relative public/private responsibility in Town of Greece and suggests a doctrinal
approach to the resulting constitutional questions. Part IV briefly shows that the
distribution principle facilitates a more precise inquiry into the establishment limits
on religious accommodations.
I. DISTRIBUTIONS OF RIGHTS AS STATE ACTION
The Legal Realists showed that the classical model of the state action doctrine
depended upon a false conception of purely private action. Following suit, many
legal scholars have concluded that the state action doctrine, at least as the Supreme
Court has applied it, is incoherent. This Part proposes a modest reformulation of the
state action doctrine that might make it a more useful tool for identifying conduct
for which the government is constitutionally responsible, clarifying substantive
constitutional doctrine and safeguarding private constitutional rights, especially in
religious liberty cases. Building on the recent work of scholars who defend the basic
contours of the state action doctrine as a way to ensure that the government is
behaving as a faithful agent of the political community, this Part suggests that state
action includes not only specific governmental acts, but also the government’s dis-
tribution of private rights. What it does not include is the way that private parties
exercise those rights.
A. The Classical Model of State Action
The Supreme Court developed the state action doctrine in the late nineteenth
century as a tool to analyze Congress’s authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amend-
ment against the states.41 In relatively short order, the Court developed three endur-
ing principles. First, “[t]he provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . all have
reference to State action exclusively, and not to any action of private individuals.”42
41 See State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 3, at 1250.
42 Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879); see also Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,
11 (1883) (“Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amend-
ment. It has a deeper and broader scope. It nullifies and makes void all State legislation, and
State action of every kind, which impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States, or which injures them in life, liberty or property without due process of law, or which
denies to any of them the equal protection of the laws.”); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542, 554 (1875) (“The fourteenth amendment . . . adds nothing to the rights of one citizen
as against another. It simply furnishes an additional guaranty against any encroachment by the
States upon the fundamental rights which belong to every citizen as a member of society.”).
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Therefore, Congress’s power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment extends
only to enforcing that Amendment’s provisions against the States, not against con-
duct by private parties.43 Under this principle, the Court concluded that Congress
lacks the power to criminalize the acts of private parties that interfere with the “due
process” and “equal protection” rights of black citizens of the United States.44 In the
Civil Rights Cases, the Court likewise rejected Congress’s power to prohibit race
discrimination by a private party that operates as a public accommodation: “[U]ntil
some State law has been passed, or some State action through its officers or agents
has been taken . . . the prohibitions of the amendment are against State laws and acts
done under State authority.”45
The second and third principles arose from a pair of cases involving discrimina-
tory jury empaneling practices in Virginia. The Court was prepared to hold that the
Equal Protection Clause guarantees a jury composed without discrimination on the
basis of race.46 Virginia’s law did not discriminate on the basis of race, but several
county judges allegedly had done so.47 In Ex parte Virginia, the Supreme Court con-
sidered the constitutionality of Section Four of the Civil Rights Act and articulated
the second principle of state action: the Fourteenth Amendment, and Congress’s power
to enforce it, extends to any act of any state agent, not just to state laws.48
43 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11–12 (“Positive rights and privileges are
undoubtedly secured by the Fourteenth Amendment; but they are secured by way of prohi-
bition against State laws and State proceedings affecting those rights and privileges, and by
power given to Congress to legislate for the purpose of carrying such prohibition into effect; and
such legislation must necessarily be predicated upon such supposed State laws or State
proceedings, and be directed to the correction of their operation and effect.”).
44 United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 643–44 (1883); Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553–55.
45 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 13; see also Harris, 106 U.S. at 639 (“When the State
has been guilty of no violation of its provisions; when it has not made or enforced any law
abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; when no one of its
departments has deprived any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
or denied to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws; when, on the
contrary, the laws of the State, as enacted by its legislative, and construed by its judicial, and
administered by its executive departments, recognize and protect the rights of all persons, the
amendment imposes no duty and confers no power upon Congress.”). The Supreme Court
has since upheld Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause to prohibit such discrim-
ination. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257–62 (1964)
(upholding Title II, the “public accommodations” provision, of the Civil Rights Act of 1964);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304–05 (1964) (same).
46 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879) (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303 (1879)).
47 Id. at 340.
48 Id. at 347 (“A State acts by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities. It can
act in no other way. The constitutional provision, therefore, must mean that no agency of the
State, or of the officers or agents by whom its powers are exerted, shall deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
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The Court further articulated the principle by stating:
Whoever, by virtue of [his] public position under a State govern-
ment, deprives another of property, life, or liberty, without due
process of law, or denies or takes away the equal protection of
the laws, violates the constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in
the name and for the State, and is clothed with the State’s power,
his act is that of the State. This must be so, or the constitutional
prohibition has no meaning. Then the State has clothed one of its
agents with power to annul or to evade it.49
The Court illustrated, without expressly articulating, the third principle in a case
involving the removal statute. In Virginia v. Rives, the Court addressed a claim by two
black defendants who sought to remove their case to federal court on the ground that
the county judge had selected an all-white grand jury and an all-white petit jury.50
In rejecting their argument that the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to provide
a racially diverse jury, the Court implicitly distinguished between what a state does
and what it does not do; in other words, between state action and state inaction.51
Importantly, the Court did not say that the Fourteenth Amendment never applies
to state inaction. Put differently, the Court did not say that the Fourteenth Amendment
places affirmative duties on the states or vests citizens with “positive libert[y].”52 It
more precisely held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require states to guar-
antee a racially diverse jury.53 The Court’s quick dismissal of the argument, however,
suggested a broader principle that the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights
provisions “incorporated” against the states ordinarily do not place affirmative duties
on the government.54
49 Id.; see also Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879).
50 100 U.S. at 314–15.
51 Id. at 322–23 (“The privilege for which they moved, and which they also asked from
the prosecution, was not a right given or secured to them, or to any person, by the law of the
State, or by any act of Congress, or by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. It is
a right to which every colored man is entitled, that, in the selection of jurors to pass upon his
life, liberty, or property, there shall be no exclusion of his race, and no discrimination against
them because of their color. But this is a different thing from the right which it is asserted
was denied to the petitioners by the State court, viz. a right to have the jury composed in part
of colored men. A mixed jury in a particular case is not essential to the equal protection of
the laws, and the right to it is not given by any law of Virginia, or by any Federal statute.”).
52 See David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
864, 864 (1986) (quoting Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983)).
53 Rives, 100 U.S. at 322–23.
54 For the most part, the Constitution’s text does not place affirmative duties on the gov-
ernment. See generally Currie, supra note 52, at 864–66. The Thirteenth Amendment is an
exception. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439–43 (1968) (holding that
Congress has the power under Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment to prohibit private
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To summarize, under the classical model of state action, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment applies only to the government, including any official act of a government agent,
but it ordinarily does not require the government to engage in affirmative acts.55 These
principles implicitly rely on notions of causation and human freedom familiar from
the law of responsibility (criminal, civil, and fiduciary) to determine whether the
government, or some private actor, is responsible for a given action.56 These “prin-
ciple[s] ha[ve] become firmly embedded in our constitutional law.”57 Even when the
Court has flirted with the notion that Congress may have the power under Section
Five to “proscribe purely private conduct,”58 it has nevertheless maintained that
“[t]he Fourteenth Amendment itself ‘erects no shield against merely private con-
duct, however discriminatory or wrongful.’”59
B. The Realist Critique
In the wake of the Reconstruction cases, and at the height of the laissez-faire
movement against government interference in the labor market, American Legal
Realists questioned the reasoning behind the classical state action doctrine.60 The
Realists’s fundamental critique of classical legal reasoning was that the concepts and
discrimination in the sale of real estate, because Congress could reasonably conclude that
such discrimination is one of the “badges and incidents of slavery”). The Sixth Amendment
right to “effective assistance of counsel” may be another. See Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (recognizing that “the right to counsel is the right to the effective as-
sistance of counsel” (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970))). This
Article, infra Part I.C, likewise addresses a handful of modern opinions that suggest that the
Constitution places at least some affirmative duties on governments. See, e.g., Denver Area
Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 737–56, 776–78 (1996) (plurality)
(discussing the FCC’s obligation to regulate obscenities on cable television); Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369, 378–81 (1967) (upholding a state court’s determination that the state may not
encourage discrimination); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (holding that state
courts may not uphold a racially restrictive covenant).
55 Currie, supra note 52, at 864–65.
56 See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883) (“The wrongful act of an indi-
vidual, unsupported by any such [state] authority, is simply a private wrong, or a crime of
that individual . . . .”).
57 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 13; see Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 165 (1978) (asserting
an “‘essential dichotomy’ between public and private acts” (citations omitted)).
58 District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424 n.8 (1973) (citing United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 762 (1966) (Clark, J., concurring); id. at 782–84 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring and dissenting)).
59 Id. at 423–24 (quoting Shelley, 334 U.S. at 13). More recently, the Court seems to have
dismissed its prior dicta suggesting that Congress has power under Section Five to prohibit
acts that Section One does not. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 624 (2000)
(citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 18).
60 See BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE
AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 30 (1998).
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formalisms upon which it depended, concealed a vacuous metaphysics inconsistent
with the objectivity of the emerging social sciences.61 Formal legal reasoning, they
argued, was indeterminate, and therefore subject to the judge’s moral, psychological,
political, and economic circumstances and beliefs.62 At the broadest level, this cri-
tique challenges the notions of causation, choice, and agency underlying the state
action doctrine.
Moreover, several theorists sought to demonstrate that there was no meaningful
distinction between public and private, and between government regulation and pri-
vate contract.63 Their doctrinal concern was the Supreme Court’s “liberty of contract”
jurisprudence, now known derisively as “Lochnerism,”64 by which the Court invalidated
a variety of state and federal labor regulations under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process Clauses.65 The Court’s freedom of contract jurisprudence is long
61 See Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM.
L. REV. 809, 821 (1935) (“Legal concepts (for example, corporations or property rights) are
supernatural entities which do not have a verifiable existence except to the eyes of faith.”);
see also Felix Cohen, The Ethical Basis of Legal Criticism, 41 YALE L.J. 201, 214–15 (1931);
Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697, 697, 700 (1931)
(“They mean by realism faithful adherence to the actualities of the legal order as the basis
of a science of law.”).
62 Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1224 (1985) (“In
place of determinacy and necessity signified by a realm of law separate from politics, [one
legal realist] approach emphasized contingency and open-ended possibilities as it exposed
the exercises of social power behind what appeared to be the neutral work of reason.”).
63 Morris Cohen and Robert Lee Hale were probably the most influential in the legal
academy. See FRIED, supra note 60, at 33–36. The key works were: Morris R. Cohen, Property
and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 22 (1927); Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in
a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 471 (1923); Robert L. Hale, Force
and the State: A Comparison of “Political” and “Economic” Compulsion, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
149, 197–98 (1935); Robert L. Hale, Law Making by Unofficial Minorities, 20 COLUM. L.
REV. 451, 452 (1920); see also JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM
4–5 (1959); RICHARD T. ELY, PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATIONS TO THE
DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH (1914); Neil Duxbury, Robert Hale and the Economy of Legal
Force, 53 MOD. L. REV. 421, 432 (1990); Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36
STAN. L. REV. 57, 104 (1984); Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1426 (1982); Peller, supra note 62, at 1193–94;
Warren J. Samuels, The Economy as a System of Power and Its Legal Bases: The Legal
Economics of Robert Lee Hale, 27 U. MIAMI L. REV. 261, 263 (1973).
64 See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 419 (2011).
65 See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (invalidating state law prohibiting
“yellow-dog” contracts that prohibited employees from joining a labor union); Adair v. United
States, 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908) (invalidating a federal law that prohibited employers from firing
employees for joining a labor union); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 63–64 (1905) (invali-
dating a state law prohibiting bakery employees from working more than ten hours a day and
more than sixty hours a week); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 593 (1897) (invalidating
a Louisiana statute prohibiting business transactions with out-of-state marine insurers).
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dead,66 but the Realist critiques continue to challenge the core concepts of the state
action doctrine.
To undermine Lochnerism, the Realists attacked the conceptual foundations of
“liberty of contract,” or the freedom of employers and employees to bargain without
governmental interference.67 The notion depended on a conception of liberty widely
held among nineteenth and twentieth century liberal thinkers—freedom from physical
coercion.68 This conception of liberty met withering critique in the twentieth cen-
tury.69 The critique holds that property is a government-granted and -enforced right
to exclude.70 The right to exclude, in turn, is nothing other than a government-backed
right to coerce another from sharing (or taking) property.71 Private rights, therefore,
entail public coercion. The “liberty of contract” is not a government-free realm of
private decision-making; instead, it is a web of complicated laws and policies that
provide the terms upon which one may call on the state’s coercive power to exclude
others. Having deconstructed the nineteenth-century notion of the liberty of contract,
some scholars distinguished negative liberty—the right to be left alone—and posi-
tive liberty—the right to certain human goods.72 Some took the next logical step,
arguing that the government’s duty goes beyond protecting the individual’s negative
66 For one account of Lochner and its demise, see Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W.
McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1792–94 (2012). See
also Joshua D. Hawley, The Intellectual Origins of (Modern) Substantive Due Process, 93
TEX. L. REV. 275 (2014).
67 See Duxbury, supra note 63, at 431.
68 See FRIED, supra note 60, at 29. Herbert Spencer was only the most recent in a line of
thinkers, including Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, to advance a conception of liberty as
freedom from governmental coercion. See HERBERT SPENCER, THE MAN VERSUS THE STATE
7–8 (Liberty Fund, Inc. 1982) (1884).
69 FRIED, supra note 60, at 37–39.
70 Cohen, supra note 63, at 12 (“[T]he essence of private property is always the right to
exclude others.”).
71 Id. (“[T]he law of property helps me directly only to exclude others from using the
things which it assigns to me. If then somebody else wants to use the food, the house, the
land, or the plow which the law calls mine, he has to get my consent. To the extent that these
things are necessary to the life of my neighbor, the law thus confers on me a power, limited
but real, to make him do what I want.”).
72 See, e.g., BERNARD BOSANQUET, THE PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY OF THE STATE (MacMillan
& Co. 1966) (1899); Thomas Hill Green, Lecture on Liberal Legislation and Freedom of
Contract, in 3 WORKS OF THOMAS HILL GREEN 365, 372 (R.L. Nettleship ed., 1888) (“[T]he
ideal of true freedom is the maximum of power for all members of human society alike to
make the best of themselves . . . .”). The distinction goes back to Immanuel Kant, at least.
Ian Carter, Positive and Negative Liberty, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 1
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2012). For the classic critique of “positive liberty,” see ISAIAH BERLIN,
Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969). For contemporary appeals
to the positive human right of developing individual capacity, see generally AMARTYA SEN,
INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992).
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rights to enforcing positive rights so that all members of society will enjoy the op-
portunity to flourish.
American Legal Realists, for the most part, advanced the foregoing critique of
the liberty of contract; unlike some of their socialist counterparts, however, they did
not advocate for the dissolution of property rights altogether.73 Realists contented
themselves with the more modest point that, contrary to conventional liberalism,
government regulation of the market was not an exogenous interference with an
otherwise zone of privacy.74 The extant distribution of property rights was not the
inevitable result of the state of nature taking its course; it was the result of state
action over centuries, as legislation, common law, and custom variously entrenched,
upset, tweaked, and re-entrenched regimes of private rights.75 The Court’s “liberty
of contract” jurisprudence was based on a mistaken predicate. Descriptively, there
was no such thing as a private sphere of freedom beyond the government’s regulatory
power; there was only government action of different kinds that shaped the parame-
ters of private choice. The key policy implication, Realists believed, was that “[w]hat
the state had made in one form, . . . it could remake in another.”76 The Supreme
Court, they argued, should get out of the business of reviewing the constitutionality
of federal and state labor regulations. The key conceptual implication was that re-
sorting to classical liberal concepts like liberty and property would never provide
any direction for how the government should distribute rights. Policy makers should
base their decisions about the proper distribution of rights on its expected effects and
should decide which effects to pursue based on their ethical values.77
In its strongest form, the Realist critique implies that the government has effec-
tively deputized every property holder to exclude others on whatever terms the law
73 FRIED, supra note 60, at 43 (“[M]ost stopped short of calling for abolition of private
property . . . .”).
74 Id. at 42–43.
75 Id. at 43–44.
76 Id. at 3.
77 Cohen, supra note 63, at 14, 17; see also FELIX S. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL
IDEALS: AN ESSAY ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL CRITICISM 7 (1933) (“Every final de-
termination of the general end of law, the standard of legal criticism, . . . must reduce to the
general form, ‘The law ought to bring about as much good as it can.’ Our problem is to give
content to this formal principle by defining the nature of the good and indicating the extent
of the law’s actual powers over that realm.”). One might still lament with Felix Cohen that
“one looks in vain in legal treatises and law-review articles for legal criticism conscious of
its moral presuppositions. The vocabularies of logic and aesthetics are freely drawn upon in
the attempt to avoid the disagreeable assertion that something or other is intrinsically better than
something else.” Id. at 5. For the most part, the “moral presuppositions” of the Realists were
drawn from social progressivism, with a special concern for the poor. Id. Morris Cohen, for
instance, appealed to “the Hebrew-Christian view—and for that matter, the specifically reli-
gious view—that the first claim on property is by the man who needs it rather than the man
who has created it.” Cohen, supra note 63, at 17.
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permits and the property holder finds acceptable.78 There is no “public” or “private.”
Every negotiation over property rights happens in the shadow of state action—past
action in distributing individual rights and future action in enforcing them. Without
this conclusion, the argument goes, the state action doctrine is hopelessly incoherent.79
Like all vacuous legal concepts, courts and commentators should abandon it and focus
on the real question: How ought the government distribute property rights to achieve
whatever its goals ought to be?
C. A Refined Account of the State Action Doctrine
Most contemporary commentators advance some permutation of the Realist
critique.80 The remainder of this Part addresses the following: (1) whether the state
action doctrine, generally speaking, is defensible; (2) what ought to count as state
action; and (3) how courts should evaluate whether an actor is a state actor.
1. A Defense of the Classical Model
Several theorists have recently offered a fresh defense of the state action doc-
trine.81 To side-step (without ignoring) the Realist critique of the public-private
dichotomy, they turn to arguments about agency.82
The Constitution applies to the government and not to private actors because
constitutional law, unlike private law, restrains public agents, not private agents.83
78 See Hale, Law Making by Unofficial Minorities, supra note 63, at 452–53.
79 Id.
80 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 14, at 363; Brest, supra note 14, at 1302 (arguing that to
avoid “collaps[ing] the public/private distinction,” constitutional positivism must maintain “a
substantive, normative theory of rights,” something current doctrine fails to do); Chemerinsky,
supra note 17, at 506 (“I contend that by any theory of rights—natural law, positivism, or
consensus—the state action requirement makes no sense.”); Peller & Tushnet, supra note 14,
at 817 (“[T]he state action doctrine, and the liberal constitutional theories associated with it,
stubbornly survive, despite their analytical incoherence.”); Phillips, supra note 17, at 683
(discussing a critique of the state action doctrine); Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 14, at
7 (“[T]he traditional state action doctrine is unsatisfactory as a guide for judicial action be-
cause it directs attention to formal questions instead of the real interests which compete for
constitutional recognition.”).
81 See, e.g., BeVier & Harrison, supra note 20, at 1785 (distinguishing between the motives
of private individuals and government agents, and justifying the state action doctrine).
82 See generally id. at 1784–85; Turner, supra note 20 (describing an institutional theory
of state action). Others defend the doctrine on the ground that it helps to protect individual
liberty. See Marshall, supra note 14, at 559 (noting the need for the state action doctrine to
protect individual rights).
83 See BeVier & Harrison, supra note 20, at 1786 (“Constitutional rules are almost all
addressed to the government.”).
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The people authorize the government to act on their behalf.84 The government and
its “agents” are “agents of the people.”85 As an agent of the political community, the
government has peculiar strengths and weaknesses, or, perhaps more accurately, pe-
culiar temptations to faithfulness. Constitutional law mitigates these temptations; it
prevents the government from upending its role as a public agent and becoming a
principal instead.86 Private law, by contrast, addresses different concerns—those that
arise when individuals are entitled to act in their own self-interest.87 The constitu-
tional agency defense thus does not deny that the government plays a role in distrib-
uting and enforcing private rights. Rather, it justifies applying unique rules to state
action on the ground that the state is obligated to serve the political community, and
private parties are not.
This theory of state action makes conceptual room for a meaningful space for
private responsibility, and therefore freedom, without dismissing the Realist critique.
Public responsibility and private rights are different. The government is obligated
to pursue the public good; private parties are entitled to pursue the good as they see
it, subject to law. Unlike the strong view of state action under the Realist critique,
the government does not deputize private parties to act, clothed with governmental
power; rather, the government allows private parties to act according to their own in-
terests. Rather than collapsing the zone of private freedom, the constitutional agency
account of state action preserves that zone without denying that it is subject to law
enacted by the political community for the public good.
The constitutional agency account of state action may seem circular: “the
Constitution applies only to governmental conduct” because the Constitution obli-
gates only the government.88 Scholars have offered two rebuttals to the circularity
objection. The first sounds in positive law: the Constitution’s text, for the most part,
applies only to the government;89 the founding generation largely understood the
Constitution to apply only to the government;90 and constitutional doctrine perpetu-
ates that understanding.91 The state action doctrine, then, is supported by the same
84 Id. at 1791.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 1785.
87 See Turner, supra note 20, at 296 (“Because private and public lawmakers have
different stereotypical strengths and weaknesses, the metalaw governing their law-making
decisions will differ in response to these characteristics.”). See generally Christian Turner,
Law’s Public/Private Structure, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1003, 1028 (2012).
88 See Chemerinsky, supra note 17, at 507.
89 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (beginning “No state shall . . . .”); id. amend. I (beginning
“Congress shall make no law . . . .”). But see id. amend XIII (“Neither slavery nor invol-
untary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States . . . .”).
90 BeVier & Harrison, supra note 20, at 1792 n.52.
91 See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 165 (1978) (asserting an “‘essential dichotomy’
between public and private acts” (citations omitted)).
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positive law theory that supports the legitimacy of all law. The second rebuttal sounds
in the fundamental nature of law: the division between the law that regulates public
law-making and the law that regulates private law-making is a natural and entirely
predictable (if not inevitable) product of the basic needs of human society.92 Both
of these accounts provide conceptually coherent justification for applying the Con-
stitution to the government, and not to private individuals.
A corollary of the positive law defense of the state action doctrine is that, as a
practical matter, the doctrine rarely causes trouble. In the vast majority of constitu-
tional disputes, the doctrine operates in the background, silently shaping the terms
of argument. It emerges into the spotlight in only two instances: when it is unclear
whether an actor is a government agent, and when it is unclear whether the Constitu-
tion requires the government to affirmatively prohibit a form of private conduct.
Those issues, irreducibly matters of judgment, are what prompted Charles Black to
declare the state action doctrine the “most important problem in American law.”93
If the doctrine can be wrestled into coherence, it may yet prove to be a relatively
neutral tool for adjudicating disputes about government agency, illuminating the
scope of disputes about affirmative constitutional duties and preserving conceptual
space for private liberty.
2. The Government’s Distributions of Rights
The Realist critique’s greatest contribution to state action theory and doctrine
is the notion that private action occurs in a complex web of law created and enforced
by the government. The baseline is freedom under law, not freedom alone, and not
coercion alone. The proper inference from this insight is not that private action is
attributable to the government, but that all governmental distributions and enforce-
ments of private rights are subject to constitutional evaluation. The constitutional
inquiry ought to focus on what the government has done or has failed to do and what-
ever the institution or agent has done or failed to do, without exempting the existing
legal baseline.94 This is the distribution principle.
Applying the Constitution to the government’s distribution of rights, including
rights the government has declined to distribute, may sound like a dramatic departure
from conventional understandings of constitutional law. But it is not. Once one has
identified the relevant rights distribution, the question is whether the Constitution
prohibits or limits that distribution. The distribution principle has nothing to say about
the answer to that question. Traditionally, constitutional law has simply not focused
92 Turner, supra note 20, at 284.
93 Black, supra note 14, at 70.
94 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 21, at 161, 204. For a contrary argument sounding in a Burkean
preference for the status quo, see Frederick Schauer, Acts, Omissions, and Constitutionalism,
105 ETHICS 916 (1995) (reviewing Sunstein’s book, The Partial Constitution).
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on distributions of rights. The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment have
little to say about the distribution of rights. They mostly create negative rights that
the government may not infringe (such as rights of speech, press, and assembly)95 or
place limits on how the government may deprive a person of non-constitutional rights
(such as “life, liberty, or property”).96 As a result, most rights distributions do not
raise a constitutional concern.
A handful of modern constitutional doctrines serve as exceptions that prove the
rule that constitutional law rarely addresses distributions of rights. The “limited
public forum” doctrine is one example. The government owns some property on
which it may entirely prohibit private speech.97 When it decides to permit some private
speech on that property, it has created a “limited public forum.”98 In the language
of state action, the government has distributed the right to speak on the property. Be-
cause the forum is “limited,” the government need not allow any and every one to
speak on the property. But the Supreme Court has held that the Free Speech Clause
does place some stipulations on the distribution of the right to participate in a limited
public forum. The distribution must be reasonably related to the forum’s purpose,
and the government may not distribute the right on the basis of the speaker’s view-
point.99 The limited public forum doctrine thus recognizes that the Constitution
places some limits on the government’s distribution of private rights.100 The doctrine
effectively holds that the Free Speech Clause puts conditions on the government’s
distribution of the affirmative right to speak.101
Perhaps the most important way that the distribution principle hones the state action
doctrine is by insisting that even government inaction is subject to constitutional
95 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
96 Id. amend. V; see Chapman & McConnell, supra note 66, at 1681 (“[D]ue Process has
from the beginning been bound up with the division of the authority to deprive subjects of
life, liberty, or property . . . .”).
97 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
98 See infra notes 278–80 and accompanying text.
99 Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46 (noting that, in a nonpublic forum, such as the work
mailboxes of government employees, the government “may reserve the forum for its in-
tended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is rea-
sonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the
speaker’s view”); see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 831 (1995) (noting that a public university’s use of funds for school publications created
a limited public forum that could not discriminate based on viewpoint); Lamb’s Chapel v.
Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993) (noting that, when a public
school opened its buildings to the public for school meetings, it created a limited public
forum and could not then deny access to a speaker based solely on the point of view of an
otherwise included subject).
100 See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46.
101 Id. at 45 (“The Constitution forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum gen-
erally open to the public even if it was not required to create the forum in the first place.”).
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scrutiny.102 Again, as with the government’s positive distributions of rights, the Con-
stitution says very little about the government’s affirmative obligations, or, con-
versely, about positive individual rights.103 Very few of the constitutional rights
provisions speak in terms of the government’s affirmative duties; almost all of them
limit the government’s power to deprive a person of rights.104 Some that may put an
affirmative duty on the government, such as the Guarantee Clause,105 have histori-
cally been considered outside the ken of the courts.106
The distribution principle’s application to state inaction does, however, suggest
a new way to understand a handful of perplexing Equal Protection Clause cases. In
Shelley v. Kraemer, for instance, the Court said that a state court’s enforcement of
a racially restrictive housing covenant constituted “state action.”107 The Court’s
objective may have been to prevent an end run by private contract around its prior
prohibition of racially restrictive zoning laws.108 Some commentators have under-
stood the Court essentially to be advancing the strong form of the Realist critique:
the homeowners were effectively state actors, and the law between them—the re-
strictive covenant—violated the Constitution.109 The distribution principle suggests
that the holding in Shelley is not that courts are state actors—of course they are—or
that private parties may magically become state actors—of course they do not—
but that the Equal Protection Clause requires states to prohibit racially restrictive
housing covenants.110 In other words, the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the
“positive” right to be free from private racially restrictive covenants, a right that the
clause requires the state to enforce.111 Under this view, it was the government’s
distribution of the right to discriminate and its concomitant failure to distribute the
positive right to be free of discrimination, that violated the Equal Protection Clause.112
The Court has elsewhere suggested that the Equal Protection Clause may require
102 See Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L.
REV. 473, 481 (1962) (suggesting that a “State can violate the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment by
‘inaction’ as well as by ‘action’”).
103 See U.S. CONST. amends. I–IV; see also supra notes 95–96.
104 See supra notes 95–96.
105 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
106 See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 39 (1849) (holding that Guarantee Clause
claims are nonjusticiable).
107 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948); see also Henkin, supra note 102, at 475.
108 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917) (invalidating a municipal ordinance re-
stricting the sale of private property to someone of another race on the ground that it “interfer[ed]
with property rights” without due process of law).
109 See, e.g., Turner, supra note 20, at 323–25.
110 Friendly, supra note 21, at 1295 (“Somehow I cannot escape the conclusion that it was
Missouri’s maintenance of a rule of common law permitting the enforcement of racially
restrictive covenants, not the action of its courts in enforcing that rule, that was the uncon-
stitutional state action in Shelley.”).
111 Id.
112 Id.
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certain distributions of rights or may provide certain positive rights.113 I take no
issue with those opinions, nor do I have a view about the extent to which the Equal
Protection Clause ought to be read to provide positive rights. The state action ques-
tion, properly conceived, clarifies, but does not answer, the substantive question one
way or the other.
Just as all private action occurs in the face of government action, it likewise
occurs in the face of government inaction. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales114 and
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services115 are illustrative.
When the government has begun to rescue one person from another, does the Con-
stitution require the government to do so with a particular level of care? Rather than
calling for an exception, these cases put a fine point on the rule: the government is
constantly in the business of creating, distributing, enforcing, and, sometimes, not
enforcing rights. Once state action or inaction has been identified, the remaining
questions are whether the Constitution restricts or requires that action/inaction, and,
if so, whether the remedy is within the courts’ competence and authority.116
Acknowledging that the Constitution applies to the government’s distribution
of rights raises a separate, and difficult, question: What, exactly, is the relevant
“distribution”? Most rights exist in a complicated web of entitlements and duties
spread out over the population and over time. The government is constantly redis-
tributing those rights, reallocating them through new legislation, administrative rule-
making, common law developments, and the like. Furthermore, one regulatory
program’s “distribution of rights” may overlap with, and even conflict with, another’s.
Many Establishment Clause cases, for instance, are especially difficult because they
involve regulatory programs that distribute overlapping and potentially conflicting
rights.117 There is no one-size-fits-all standard for determining the relevant distribu-
tion of rights. Context will suggest answers, and reasonable people may often
disagree. As I explain more fully in the next Part, in general, it is probably best to
determine the relevant distribution of rights for constitutional analysis by reference
to the applicable constitutional rule. If the question is whether the government de-
prived someone of liberty without due process of law, the relevant state action is
easy: the process the government did (and did not) give to the individual. If the
constitutional question is whether the government impermissibly influenced private
choice with the distribution of school vouchers, the relevant distribution, I argue,
113 See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
114 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (holding that a plaintiff may not sue a town under Section 1983
for failing to enforce a restraining order, even though enforcement may have prevented a
man from killing his children).
115 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (holding that a state agency’s failure to protect a boy who was under
state supervision from his father’s abuse did not violate the child’s constitutional rights).
116 See generally LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF:
CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 26–48 (1996).
117 See infra Part II.A.
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includes all of the schooling alternatives the government made available. In both
cases, what counts as state action versus private action has already been determined.
The question is which state action is relevant to the constitutional analysis. Just like
the application of any law to a set of facts, the applicable legal rule (in this case, the
applicable constitutional rule) determines which facts are relevant.
One complaint about applying the Constitution to the distribution of rights may
be that it appears to leave no room for natural rights. When James Madison proposed
the Bill of Rights, for instance, he asserted that the right of conscience was a natural
right that the First Amendment would merely enshrine.118 For the most part, modern
constitutional law, however, does not purport to enforce natural rights.119 The Ninth
Amendment prohibits “constru[ing]” an enumerated constitutional right “to deny or
disparage others retained by the people,”120 but courts rarely, if ever, purport to enforce
unenumerated natural rights. Indeed, rather than forthrightly enforce unenumerated
natural rights, the Court has felt obligated to root substantive due process rights in
“penumbras, formed by emanations from [the] guarantees” of the Bill of Rights.121
In theory, however, the distribution principle does not foreclose a court from en-
forcing natural rights against the government. The court would simply include a
natural right analysis in whatever constitutional limit it sought to enforce against the
relevant state action.
3. Agency
A state action issue most often arises when it is unclear whether conduct is prop-
erly attributable either to the government or to a private party.122 Courts routinely
rely on ordinary agency principles to determine whether the actor is a governmental
agent.123 If the actor is an agent of the government, her conduct is attributable to the
government as the principal, and it is subject to the Constitution.124 If the actor is
entitled to act in her own interest, her conduct is private, and is therefore not subject
to the Constitution.125
118 See 1 ANNALS. OF CONG. 434–42 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
119 See Phillip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions,
102 YALE L.J. 907, 909–10 (1993).
120 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
121 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
122 See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972) (describing the
“essential dichotomy” between state and private conduct); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,
11 (1883) (articulating the state action doctrine for the first time).
123 See, e.g., Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 298–
302 (2001) (holding that a private association regulating sports among public and private sec-
ondary schools was a state actor); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 470 (1953) (holding that the
Jaybird Democratic Association’s exclusion of Negroes violated the Fifteenth Amendment).
124 See, e.g., Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. 288.
125 See, e.g., Blum v. Yarestsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1003–05 (1982) (holding that the fact that
a private business was subject to state regulation did not mean that the business was a state
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This approach has much to recommend it. First, it is easy to apply in the vast
majority of cases. No one wonders whether a police officer walking a beat is a gov-
ernment agent or whether the homeowner selling his property is a private party.
Applying formal agency principles carries into the hard cases the same reasoning
that makes the easy cases easy.
Second, the approach attempts to distinguish the substantive constitutional ques-
tion from the more mundane question of whether the person was a government agent.
This promotes conceptual clarity, which renders constitutional decision-making more
rational and open to internal and external critique.
Third, the approach accords with the rationale for the doctrine. The Constitution
applies to the government and not to private actors because the government is an
agent of the people. A government acts through human agents who are bound by law
to pursue the government’s, and therefore the political community’s, interests. The
state action question, therefore, is whether the person was obligated to act in the
public interest, rather than his or her own.126 If so, his or her conduct is subject to the
Constitution. Conversely—and this is a crucial point explored more fully below—
where the individual has a constitutional right to choose among courses of action,
the action cannot conceptually be attributable to the government.127 The background
constitutional right shapes the contours of the government’s sub-constitutional dis-
tribution of rights.
Many theorists criticize the agency approach.128 They argue that robing the state
action analysis in agency principles merely masks a judgment that is inevitably
functional and driven by unstated constitutional values of whether the law ought to
prohibit the conduct at issue.129 They propose alternative tests that would balance
underlying constitutional values such as the defendant’s constitutional liberty, the
plaintiff’s interest in justice, and the relative value of having different governmental
institutions decide the scope of constitutionality.130 Some argue that whether a
person is a state actor should depend on which constitutional doctrine is at issue.131
By contrast to these proposals, the distribution principle would not change ordinary
agency analysis. Rather, by opening the possibility that the relevant state action may
be a distribution of private rights instead of a particular act or omission, the principle
reduces pressure to contort agency principles past the point of plausibility.
actor); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 839–43 (1981) (holding that a school’s receipt
of government funds does not make it a state actor).
126 See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301–02 (1966) (holding that a privately
owned park managed in trust by a municipality could not discriminate by race).
127 See infra Part I.B.
128 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 14; Chemerinsky, supra note 17; Turner, supra note 20;
Van Alstyne & Karst, supra note 14; Michael L. Wells, Identifying State Actors in Constitu-
tional Litigation: Reviving the Role of Substantive Context, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 99 (2004).
129 Alexander, supra note 14, at 372; Wells, supra note 128, at 112–13.
130 Wells, supra note 128, at 118–19.
131 See id. at 113.
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Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority132 is a good example. In Wilmington Park-
ing, a government agency leased space to a coffee shop.133 The coffee shop discrimi-
nated against African Americans.134 The question was whether the Equal Protection
Clause prohibited that discrimination, which depended on whether the discrimina-
tion was attributable to the government.135 Under an ordinary agency analysis, the
answer is no. The shop was not a government agent; it was a tenant, acting at arm’s
length and entitled to pursue its own interests subject to the lease. But that analysis
leaves many people dissatisfied because it underplays both the government’s role in
making the coffee shop’s discrimination possible and the potential symbolic connec-
tion between the government’s property and the coffee shop’s discrimination.
The Court found that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the discrimination,
but it had to twist agency concepts to get there.136 Looking at all the facts behind the
government’s real estate development and lease, the Court concluded that the coffee
shop was sufficiently connected to the government action to be subject to the Equal
Protection Clause.137 Under one of the balancing approaches proposed by scholars,
the Court could have reached the same constitutional result by a more candid as-
sessment of whether constitutional values, on balance, favored applying the Equal
Protection Clause to the coffee shop’s discrimination.138
This Article’s proposed account of the state action doctrine, by contrast, sug-
gests another analysis that ignores neither ordinary agency concepts nor the govern-
ment’s role in the coffee shop’s race discrimination. Delaware was not responsible
for the coffee shop’s discrimination;139 the coffee shop was a private actor.140
Delaware did not obligate the shop to discriminate; the shop’s owners and managers
chose to do so.141 Delaware was, however, responsible for distributing to the coffee
shop the right to discriminate on the basis of race. The Wilmington Parking Author-
ity, undoubtedly a government agent, distributed the lease rights to the coffee shop
and did not withdraw those rights upon evidence that the coffee shop was engaging
in racial discrimination.142 Then the Delaware Supreme Court interpreted a Delaware
statute allowing restaurants to refuse service to those who would “offen[d] . . . the
major part of [its] customers and would injure business”143 to permit the coffee shop
132 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
133 Id. at 719.
134 Id. at 716.
135 Id. at 716–17.
136 See id. at 722–24.
137 Id. at 717.
138 Wells, supra note 128, at 118–19.
139 See generally Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. at 719–21 (describing the leasing
agreement between the State Authority and the coffee shop).
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 24 § 1501 (1958).
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to discriminate.144 The sum total was that Delaware, by a lease, a statute, and its
interpretation of that statute, distributed to the shop the right to discriminate.145
Under this analysis, therefore, the constitutional question was whether the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits a state from generally distributing (through a statute) or
specifically distributing (to independent government contractors) the right to engage
in racial discrimination.146 Properly understood, the Court’s answer was yes.147 The
remaining doctrinal questions are whether that is a plausible reading of the Equal
Protection Clause and, if so, how far the principle goes.148
In sum, the classical state action doctrine’s distinction between public and private
action is sound, with an important caveat: the distribution principle. The Constitu-
tion does not apply to the way that private parties use their rights to further their
own interests, but the Constitution does apply to the government’s distribution of
those private rights. Furthermore, the distribution principle, in conjunction with an
ordinary agency analysis, ensures a conceptual distinction between the government’s
relevant conduct and whether the Constitution prohibits or requires that conduct.
This distinction allows the substantive constitutional question to come into focus
and maintains a conceptually coherent space for individual responsibility, and there-
fore, freedom.
II. PRIVATE CHOICE
The distribution principle clarifies cases involving government-issued vouchers.
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Court addressed a program that provided vouch-
ers for private schools, including some religious schools.149 The Court decided that
the program was valid because it was religiously neutral and allowed “true private
choice.”150 This formula obscures the state action question. Applying the distribution
principle, the Court could have concluded that the voucher program distributed
educational liberty. This reveals a slightly different, more accurate, and probably
more difficult constitutional question than whether the program was facially neutral:
Did the government impermissibly incentivize parents to choose religious schools?
144 See Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Burton, 157 A.2d 894, 902 (Del. 1960).
145 See Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. at 724.
146 Id. at 725.
147 See id. at 724–26.
148 Compare id. (holding that the state’s leasing of property to an independent coffee shop
made it a joint participant in the coffee shop’s racial discrimination), with Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause does not
forbid a government from issuing a liquor license to a private club that engages in racial
discrimination).
149 536 U.S. 639, 662 (2002).
150 See McConnell, supra note 2, at 690–91 (discussing the plurality opinion in Mitchell
v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000)).
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A. The “Private Choice” Test in School Aid Cases
The Supreme Court has had a hard time articulating Establishment Clause limits
on government spending that flows to religious schools.151 To some extent the en-
deavor has been doomed by disagreements about the history and purposes of the
Religion Clauses and about the Court’s role in enforcing those clauses.152 For most
of the latter half of the twentieth century, the Court’s Establishment Clause analysis
of school aid was unstable and unpredictable—even incoherent.153 It is still somewhat
unclear whether and when a court should apply various doctrinal formulae such as
the Lemon test,154 the “pervasively secular” test,155 and the “endorsement” test.156
The Rehnquist Court gradually articulated a different approach: that a religiously
neutral governmental program that gives recipients vouchers to use on services pro-
vided by religious organizations is constitutional.157 The cases peaked in Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, where the Court upheld a program that gave parents a tuition
voucher that they could assign to a private school, regardless of whether the school
151 See GREENAWALT, supra note 39, at 392–432.
152 See, e.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITU-
TIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1995) (discussing the Court’s role in shaping the
Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
153 Compare Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 367–72 (1975) (invalidating a program that
loaned instructional materials, like maps, to religious schools), and Wolman v. Walter, 433
U.S. 229, 252–55 (1977) (invalidating a similar program that loaned instructional materials,
like maps, to students who attend religious schools), with Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236, 245–49 (1968) (upholding a program that loaned “secular” textbooks to students who
attend religious schools). See 124 CONG. REC. 25,661 (1978) (statement of Sen. Moynihan)
(inquiring what the Court would do about a program that loaned to students an atlas, “a book
of maps”); LEONARD LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 162–63 (1986); Thomas C. Berg, Religion Clause Anti-Theories, 72 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 693, 696, 700 (1997); John H. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment
and the Philosophy of the Constitution, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 847, 847–48 (1984).
154 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See generally McCreary Cty. v. Am. Civil
Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 890 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
application of the neutrality principle of the Lemon test); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Future
of Constitutional Law, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 647, 665–66 (2006) (discussing Lemon).
155 See Columbia Union Coll. v. Oliver, 254 F.3d 496, 501–04 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding
that Mitchell, 530 U.S. 793, replaced the “pervasively sectarian” test with a “neutrality plus”
test).
156 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
157 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662 (2002). See generally Mitchell, 530
U.S. 793 (permitting the dispersing of federal funds for secular purposes to parochial schools);
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (allowing a state-supplied inter-
preter for a deaf student at a religious school); Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind,
474 U.S. 481 (1986) (holding that state-supplied vocational rehabilitation for a blind seminary
student was constitutional); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding a tax deduction
for individual expenditures on private schools).
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was religious.158 The Court emphasized two aspects of the program that made it com-
pliant with the Establishment Clause.159 First, the program was religiously neutral in
light of all of the educational options the government subsidized, including public
schools.160 Second, whether any money flowed to a religious school was entirely depen-
dent upon a parent’s decision to claim a voucher and to spend it on a private school.161
The dissenting Justices had two main objections. First, they believed the proper
way to measure the program’s neutrality was by comparing schools on which parents
could spend a voucher, not by comparing all of the government-supported schools
a parent could choose.162 On this narrower view of government action, the program
was less religiously neutral, because there were many more religious than nonreli-
gious private schools, and, on average, the religious schools were far less expensive
than the non-religious private schools.163 Second, the dissenters believed that the
parents were less free to choose a religious school than they were to choose a non-
religious private school.164 The government, the dissenters concluded, was responsi-
ble for the religious “indoctrination” that resulted.165 The dispute between the majority
and dissenting Justices in Zelman has ongoing implications for a swath of school
voucher programs,166 social welfare programs,167 and faith-based initiatives where
the government partners with religious organizations.168
B. Rethinking Zelman and State Action
The Court in Zelman did not expressly connect the state action doctrine and the
“private choice” component of the Court’s analysis.169 Doing so would have clari-
fied the action for which the government was responsible and complicated the
constitutional question. Properly understood, the government was responsible for
distributing a variety of educational options to parents. Parents have a constitutional
right to determine their child’s education. All of the alternatives the government
makes available to parents, including schools entirely funded by the government, are
therefore part of the relevant distribution of rights. The remaining constitutional
158 Zelman, 536 U.S. 639.
159 Id. at 653–56.
160 Id. at 653.
161 Id. at 653–56.
162 Id. at 697–98 (Souter, J., dissenting).
163 Id. at 703–05.
164 Id. at 707.
165 Id. at 685.
166 See Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2008) (invalidating a
university scholarship program for being insufficiently neutral among religious colleges).
167 Freedom from Religion Found. v. McCallum, 324 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding
a program that allowed prisoners to choose a halfway house, among others, that taught
Christianity).
168 Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, Inc.,
509 F.3d 406 (8th Cir. 2007).
169 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652–53.
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question is whether the government impermissibly coerced or incentivized parents
to choose a religious school.
1. Two Ways to Misconceive the State Action Question
Courts and scholars have misconceived the state action question in school funding
cases in two ways. The first denies that the program allows meaningful private choice;
the second holds that the government is responsible for private decisions.
The dissenting Justices in Zelman advanced the first argument. The dissenters
defined the relevant distribution of rights narrowly to include only the vouchers.170
The public school and home school options available to parents, thus, were not
relevant to the dissenters’ calculus.171 The voucher distribution was facially neutral
because it allowed a parent to choose a religious or nonreligious private school, but
it was not substantively neutral because there were more religious schools to choose
from and they cost less on average than nonreligious schools.172 The parents did not
exercise private choice, the dissenters concluded, because the distribution of options
was not substantively neutral.173 Without private choice in the equation, the govern-
ment was responsible for the parent’s use of vouchers on religious schools. The
parents, therefore, were nothing more than a conduit for government funds to re-
ligious schools. If the government may not give money directly to religious schools, it
may not do so through a conduit.174 The dissenters were correct that the effect of the
government program on private choice may be relevant to the Establishment Clause
question, but they should not have collapsed private choice and the government’s
distribution of rights. Doing so essentially reads the parents, their educational prefer-
ences, and their constitutional rights, out of the equation.
Several scholars have advanced the more nuanced position that the government
is responsible for the private choice of voucher recipients. For instance, Laura
Underkuffler argues that the government is responsible for the use of vouchers when
the government “authorizes” private individuals to use vouchers to affect a public
purpose, like education, and “anticipates” that recipients will use the vouchers on
religious schools.175 To maintain a distinction between state and private action,176
170 Id. at 703 (Souter, J., dissenting).
171 See id.
172 Id. at 703–05.
173 See id. at 698–707.
174 See id.
175 See Laura S. Underkuffler, The Price of Vouchers for Religious Freedom, 78 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 463, 473 (2001) [hereinafter Underkuffler, The Price]; see also Laura S.
Underkuffler, Vouchers and Beyond: The Individual Causative Agent in Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 167, 170 (2000) [hereinafter Underkuffler, Vouchers] (“In these
cases, there is no question about the existence of state action, since it is the government’s
funding action (or other action) which is, itself, the potentially unconstitutional act.”).
176 See Underkuffler, Vouchers, supra note 175, at 170 (noting that the government
“funding action (or other action) . . . is, itself, the potentially unconstitutional act”).
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Underkuffler relies on agency concepts—“authorize” and “anticipate”—to suggest
that voucher recipients are effectively state agents because, in exercising their choice,
they are merely putting into effect the state’s public purpose of education.177 Thus,
the state, not the recipient, is responsible for a recipient’s school choice, the result-
ing distribution of money to that school, and the school’s use of that money for
religious activities, including religious “indoctrination.” As we shall see, this de-
scription of the transaction neglects a parent’s constitutional right to pursue not only
the state’s educational purposes, but also her own.
Similarly, Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle argue that the “official awareness” that gov-
ernment “grantees’ foreseeable use of religious means to meet [public] goals should
lead to an attribution of governmental responsibility for the use of such means.”178
This is because the Establishment Clause forbids governments from “select[ing] or
includ[ing] distinctly religious means to achieve public ends.”179 Lupu and Tuttle give
no citation for this Establishment Clause rule.180 Even under the Lemon test—the
most restrictive doctrinal formula that might apply—the issue is whether the govern-
ment’s “purpose” and “effect” are to advance or inhibit religion, not whether the gov-
ernment advanced its own legitimate purposes with religion.181 A “religious means”
rule seems patently at odds with a number of Establishment Clause decisions and
governmental practices.182 For instance, the Obama Administration has recently
cooperated with local churches to distribute information about how to enroll in a
government-run “Health Insurance Marketplace.”183 Under Lupu and Tuttle’s account,
a church’s use of the “Second Sunday & Faith Weekend of Action Toolkit,” pro-
vided by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,184 would probably
amount to the use of “religious means to achieve public ends,” in violation of the
177 See Underkuffler, The Price, supra note 175, at 473.
178 Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Faith-Based Initiative and the Constitution, 55
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 65 (2005).
179 Id.
180 See id. at 60–66.
181 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971); see also Sch. Dist. of Abington
Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (“The test may be stated as follows: what are the
purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition
of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power . . . .”).
182 See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (upholding use of reli-
gious invocation before a town meeting to promote secular goal of civic unity); Van Orden
v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (upholding a display of the Ten Commandments in proximity
to a public building); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
842–46 (1995) (holding that the Free Speech Clause requires a university to make publication
services equally available to religious groups); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 676–80
(1970) (upholding a property tax exemption for worship centers to promote secular goals).
183 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SECOND SUNDAY & FAITH WEEKEND
OF ACTION TOOLKIT (2014), http://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/partnerships/aca_act_and
_community/secondsunday.pdf [http://perma.cc/7UJH-98JC].
184 See id.
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Establishment Clause.185 The Establishment Clause analyses proposed by Underkuffler,
Lupu, and Tuttle all depend on a state action analysis that attributes the decisions of
private parties to the government because it allows, and to some extent enables, those
decisions.186 But government permission, anticipation, and even enabling of private
action do not make it the government’s. If it did, then the vast majority of private de-
cisions would be both attributable to the government and subject to the Constitution.
The question is whether a private party is obligated to pursue the government’s pur-
poses or entitled to pursue her own. As I explain below, parents are constitutionally
entitled, within broad standards designed to promote a generally educated citizenry,
to direct their child’s education according to their own moral views.
2. The Distribution of Educational Liberty
The Zelman Court should have analyzed vouchers as a distribution of educa-
tional liberty.187 Under ordinary agency principles, government-provided vouchers
are government action; spending them is not.188 The government already provided
public schools, including magnet schools, and permitted home-schooling. The vouchers
simply represented another government-funded educational option.189
The Court and the dissenting Justices muddled this analysis by couching the
constitutional question as whether the government had deprived parents of “true
private choice.”190 The two sides bickered over whether the relative cost and location
of various schooling options overly burdened or incentivized parents’ behavior.191
But incentives only work on someone who is free. No one seriously contended that
parents were deprived of their freedom. Furthermore, had the program actually de-
prived parents of educational choice, it would have violated their constitutional right
to determine their child’s education.192 No one, including the dissenting Justices,
suggested that the program went that far. The incentives created by the voucher pro-
gram were relevant to the Establishment Clause question, I suggest, but not to the
185 See, e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 178, at 65.
186 Perhaps Underkuffler’s and Lupu and Tuttle’s accounts may be translated to present
a “disparate impact” theory of the Establishment Clause: the government may be constitu-
tionally responsible not for parents’ individual choices, but for the aggregate effect of the
voucher program on those choices. In that case, their theories would be about the substantive
constitutional requirements on governmental distributions. Even under that translation, however,
their arguments still fail to explain how the government could be responsible for the effects
of freely made private decisions.
187 See generally Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 643–63 (2002) (majority
opinion).
188 See id. at 653–54.
189 See id. at 647.
190 See id. at 653; id. at 706 (Souter, J., dissenting).
191 See id. at 658–60 (majority opinion); id. at 707 (Souter, J., dissenting).
192 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
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state action question. The action for which the government was responsible was dis-
tributing educational options, including school vouchers.
A more difficult question was determining the relevant distribution of rights for
purposes of constitutional analysis. The majority believed the analysis should include
all the educational options provided by the government, including government-funded
schools; the dissenting Justices focused their analysis on only the vouchers. For the
reasons I explain below, the answer depends on the applicable constitutional rule.
3. The Substantive Question: Impermissible Incentives?
The Court evaluated whether the government’s total distribution of educational
opportunities was religiously neutral and permitted “individuals to exercise genuine
choice.”193 Given that the government fully funded a variety of schools, including mag-
net schools, and that vouchers did not fully cover the cost at any private schools, the
Court concluded that the government’s total distribution of educational alternatives was
religiously neutral and that parents had a true choice about which alternative to choose.
Unfortunately, the Court baked the parents’ freedom of choice into the constitu-
tional standard, which muddied its analysis. Whether parents have a choice is an
empirical question. Ordinarily, courts assume that people who are legally free to
choose among alternatives have a choice. What the Court was struggling to analyze
was not whether parents actually had a choice, but whether the government’s distri-
bution of educational options impermissibly incentivized parents to choose a religious
school. The logic underlying the Court’s analysis, therefore, assumes that: (1) the
Establishment Clause prohibits the government from incentivizing private parties from
choosing religious schools; (2) courts can articulate a principled standard for evalu-
ating government incentives; (3) the relevant government action for evaluating those
incentives includes all government-funded educational options; and (4) courts can
measure the influence of a particular government program on private choices made
for a variety of private reasons. Each of these assumptions is contestable.
It seems uncontroversial to say that the Establishment Clause prohibits the
government from coercing individuals into religious activity. And it is not unreason-
able to believe this principle extends beyond direct coercion to encompass govern-
ment rules or policies that incentivize or pressure individuals to engage in religious
activity. Such a notion underlies the Constitution’s prohibition on religious tests for
public office194 and the Supreme Court’s school prayer cases.195 At the same time,
however, the government has a wide variety of policies that place modest pressure
193 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662.
194 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“[B]ut no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualifi-
cation to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”). See generally Gerard V. Bradley,
The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine That Has
Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 674 (1987).
195 See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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on private parties to engage in one form of religious activity over another. Though
the Court does not tolerate student-led prayers before a public high school football
game,196 it protects clergy-led invocations before town board meetings and state leg-
islative sessions.197 Likewise, the Court has never suggested that the government’s
long-standing practice of closing offices on Sundays and Christian holidays violates
the Establishment Clause, though it makes it easier to practice Christianity than
Judaism or Islam.198 The question, then, is what burdens and incentives the Estab-
lishment Clause prohibits.199
Assuming that the Court could articulate a principled “impermissible incentives”
standard, a remaining question is the relevant scope of government action to which
that standard applies. In Zelman, the Justices disputed the relevant scope of govern-
ment action. Once the government action (the distribution of vouchers) has been
distinguished from private action (spending the vouchers), and the substantive con-
stitutional question has been clarified (has the government impermissibly incentivized
private religious activity?), the relevant scope of government action becomes more
obvious: whatever action is relevant for determining whether the government has
impermissibly incentivized private religious activity. In Zelman, the relevant gov-
ernment action was the government’s distribution of education benefits, including
government-funded schools, vouchers for private schools, and the option of home-
schooling. All of these options were relevant for accurately weighing the incentives
and burdens placed on private choice by the voucher program, for all of them were
mutually exclusive options available to parents.
Once a court has identified the relevant distribution of rights, there remains a
difficult question about whether the distribution did in fact incentivize or burden
private choice. In Zelman, the Justices analyzed the voucher program as though the
quantum of influence that a government program has on private choice can be
measured with a straightforward cost-benefit analysis. In some situations that may
be the case. But a court is unlikely to have the granular level of information that
would be necessary to account for why parents choose one educational alternative
over another for their child. One parent may value proximity to her workplace;
196 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
197 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
783 (1983).
198 See, e.g., Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt. of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
199 See Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, Sites of Redemption: A Wide-Angle Look at Gov-
ernment Vouchers and Sectarian Service Providers, 18 J.L. & POL. 539, 556–57 (2002)
(asking whether the government program “creates substantial pressures on recipients to
undertake religious experience”); see also id. at 596–97 (describing the concern as whether
the government is “steering students into religious training”); McConnell, supra note 2, at
692 (affirming the constitutional question, “Has [the government] created any incentives to
engage in (or refrain from engaging in) religious activity?”). See generally Michael W.
McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1989) (proposing a notion of substantive neutrality that focuses on
whether the government action unduly incentivizes or burdens private religious exercise).
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another may choose one school for one child and another for a different child based
on extracurricular interests; another parent may choose a school based on its test
results; and another may simply choose the least expensive option (which would ordi-
narily be the government-funded school, not a private school that is partially subsi-
dized by a voucher). All of these decisions could be made within a voucher program
like the one in Zelman, and none of them have anything to do with the religiosity of
the school. And measuring the religious effects—positive and negative—on sending
a child to a school with a religious curriculum is even less prone to principled empir-
ical analysis.
These are hard constitutional and empirical questions. Perhaps the Court merged
the state action and Establishment Clause analyses in Zelman to avoid confronting
them. A more accurate account of state action at issue—the distribution of educational
rights—would have at least clarified the difficult constitutional questions, rather than
perpetuating a doctrine that merges the state action and Establishment Clause analyses.
III. RELIGIOUS SPEECH
Some of the most difficult state action questions arise when the government and
private actors collaborate to speak. Especially when the speech is religious, the
answer to the “agency” question is often determinative for the substantive constitu-
tional analysis: though individuals enjoy broad speech and free exercise rights, the
Establishment Clause limits the government’s religious speech.200
In a handful of cases, the Supreme Court has applied agency principles, without
invoking the state action doctrine, to determine whether religious speech is attribut-
able to the government or to a private speaker.201 But the Court has failed to grasp
the threat to individual liberty of an agency analysis that gives insufficient consider-
ation to the role of private choice in shaping the speech at issue.
200 See Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1989) (“[T]here is a crucial difference
between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and
private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.”);
Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83
N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 616 (2008) (“The establishment clause bars the government from en-
dorsing religion and religious beliefs or otherwise commenting on religious truth.”); McConnell,
supra note 2, at 682 (“Precisely the same conduct—leading prayers, for example—is consti-
tutionally valued and protected if engaged in by private parties, though unconstitutional if
done by the government.”).
201 See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009) (concluding that
a Ten Commandments monument in a public park was government, not private, speech);
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000) (concluding that the government
was responsible for an elected student chaplain’s invocation before a football game); see also
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 560–62 (2005) (applying agency principles
to determine whether an advertising campaign was attributable to the government or participating
companies); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 762–69 (1995)
(debating whether the “endorsement” test applies to private speech on public property).
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In Town of Greece v. Galloway, for example, rather than clearly distinguish be-
tween the town’s conduct and each chaplain’s responsibility for the specifics of his
or her own speech, the Court applied the Establishment Clause to the whole coordi-
nated effort.202 The result was a muddled and unsatisfying Establishment Clause
analysis that gave insufficient attention to private speech rights.203 The Court should
have applied Establishment Clause principles to the town’s distribution of the right
to give an invocation. The substantive questions that emerge are whether the gov-
ernment: (1) may pick and choose chaplains on the basis of religion; (2) must
engage in religious affirmative action; and/or (3) must take steps to declare that the
“sectarian” speech of each chaplain is the chaplain’s, and not the town’s.
A. Town of Greece
The Greece, New York, town board has monthly meetings at which it handles
public business, including rule-making and adjudicating individual variance re-
quests.204 About ten years ago, it decided to open board meetings with an invocation
by a “chaplain of the month.”205 To select chaplains, a volunteer staff member con-
sulted a list of ministers in a publication by the Greece Chamber of Commerce.206
All of the ministers listed were clergy in a Christian denomination.207 Greece has
almost no non-Christian houses of worship, though there are synagogues and
mosques in neighboring Rochester.208 The staff member called every institution on
the list to invite the minister to be a chaplain of the month.209 Those who accepted
the first invitation were put on a list of rotating chaplains of the month.210
Greece did nothing to shape the content of the individual prayers.211 “The town
instead left the guest clergy free to compose their own devotions.”212 Until litigation
ensued, all of the invocations were offered by various sorts of Christian clergy.213
Some prayers included language unique to Christian theology,214 and at least one
expressed gratitude that Greece’s leaders were pious by Christian standards.215
202 See 134 S. Ct. at 1818.
203 See id. at 1851–52 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
204 Id. at 1825 (majority opinion).
205 Id. at 1816.
206 Id. at 1839–40 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
207 Id. at 1816 (majority opinion).
208 See id. at 1839 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting the existence of a Buddhist temple in
Greece).
209 Id. at 1816 (majority opinion).
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 1816–17.
214 Id. at 1816–17, 1824.
215 See id. at 1824.
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A meeting began with an invocation immediately followed by a variety of civic
housekeeping, including awards for civic duty, announcements, etc.216 The chaplain
faced the public audience with the board members behind him like a preacher in
front of a choir.217 Some of the board members bowed or crossed themselves.218
Sometimes the chaplain asked the audience to stand for the invocation.219
After the plaintiffs told them that the overt Christian language in one or more
of the prayers “gave them offense and made them feel excluded and disrespected,”220
the town made efforts to include non-Christian chaplains.221 “[T]he town invited a
Jewish layman and the chairman of the local Baha’i temple to deliver prayers,” and
also allowed a Wiccan priestess to do so.222 Since the Court issued its judgment, the
town has also hosted an atheist “invocation.”223 The plaintiffs were unsatisfied with
the town’s newfound pluralism and sued.224
The Court, in a 5–4 decision, held that Greece’s invocation practice did not vio-
late the Establishment Clause because it did not “denigrate nonbelievers or religious
minorities, threaten damnation, or preach conversion,”225 nor was it too “coercive.”226
Remarkably, none of the Justices questioned the enduring validity of Marsh v.
Chambers,227 which upheld, over Justice Brennan’s strenuous objection, the Nebraska
legislature’s chaplain program.228 Nebraska paid a local Presbyterian minister to
offer an invocation before each legislative session.229 In Town of Greece, the dispute
between the majority and dissenting Justices was whether the invocation practice in
Greece was meaningfully different.230
216 See id. at 1825; id. at 1829 (Alito, J., concurring).
217 See id. at 1848 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
218 Id. at 1826 (majority opinion).
219 Id.; id. at 1848 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
220 Id. at 1826 (majority opinion).
221 Id. at 1817. But see id. at 1848 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[A]fter a brief spell surrounding
the filing of this suit . . . the Town resumed its practice of inviting only clergy from neighboring
Protestant and Catholic churches.”).
222 Id. at 1817 (majority opinion).
223 Kimberly Winston, Atheist to Offer Invocation in N.Y. Town at the Center of Public
Prayer Case, WASH. POST (June 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/religion
/athiest-to-offer-invocation-in-ny-town-at-the-center-of-public-prayer-case/2014/06/23
/fb14bba2-fb10-11e3-9f27-09f20b8bfd1a_story.html [http://perma.cc/RA2N-M8CH].
224 See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1817.
225 Id. at 1823 (rejecting the proposition that legislative prayer must be nonsectarian be-
cause it would cause the government to become too involved in religious speech, but noting
the speech cannot proselytize).
226 See id. at 1827 (“But in the general course legislative bodies do not engage in imper-
missible coercion merely by exposing constituents to prayer they would rather not hear and
in which they need not participate.”).
227 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
228 Id. at 793–95; see id. at 795–822 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
229 Id. at 784–85 (majority opinion).
230 See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1827; id. at 1842 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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In effect, Marsh creates a baseline that demands a case-by-case review of in-
vocations anytime they happen outside the context of a state legislature. This becomes
particularly difficult as America becomes more religiously diverse. In Town of Greece,
the Court provided some guidelines: the government’s legislative prayer practice may
be neither coercive nor too sectarian.231
This standard provides more guidance than Marsh, but it still calls for a case-by-
case factual analysis and relies heavily on each judge’s personal view of how much
Jesus-talk and how much pressure is too much.232 Given the Court’s scant case law
on the topic, it would be difficult for a government or court to know how far would
be too far (at least outside the context of an elementary or secondary school).233
More problematically, the Court’s analysis does little to account for the constitu-
tional difficulty posed by the facts in Town of Greece and presumably many other gov-
ernmental invocation practices.234 The government is at least approving, if not engaging
in, religious speech in a context that is likely to make townspeople who do not share
the chaplain’s faith feel like political outsiders.235 This would be intolerable under pre-
vailing Establishment Clause doctrine were it not for Marsh and a long tradition of
legislative prayers.236 On the other side of the ledger, however, Greece was not direct-
ing the content of each individual prayer, and sponsoring an official invocation has
long been understood, at least in part, as an accommodation of many citizens’ religious
beliefs that government should humbly rely on the support of a higher power.237
Importantly, the dissenting Justices’s proposals would do little to solve either the
“sectarian” or “coercive” problem in Town of Greece or a similar case, nor would they
likely reduce the net total of townspeople who feel like political outsiders.238 Requiring
chaplains to tone down the religion-specific aspects of their prayers, although satis-
fying some, would ostracize others. A Trinitarian Christian is unlikely to condone
a prayer “to whom it may concern,” and an atheist certainly would not. Furthermore,
such a policy would potentially interfere with the chaplain’s speech and free exercise
rights.239 The second proposal—doing more to facilitate a rotating cast of religious
perspectives—would likewise be unsatisfactory. Few people are regulars at town
board meetings. An attendee’s immediate experience with a chaplain from another
faith will determine whether he or she feels like an outsider. It will not matter that
231 Id. at 1825 (majority opinion).
232 See generally Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. 1811; Marsh, 463 U.S. 783.
233 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 313–17 (2000) (concluding that
the government was responsible for an elected student chaplain’s invocation before a football
game); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586–99 (1992) (holding that clergy who offer a prayer
as part of a public school graduation ceremony violate the Establishment Clause).
234 See, e.g., 134 S. Ct. 1811.
235 Id. at 1841 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
236 See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795.
237 See id. at 792.
238 See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. 1811.
239 See, e.g., id. at 1816.
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someone from his or her church gave the invocation last month. If anything, it would
render the entire practice even more religiously incoherent than it already is, ensur-
ing that each attendee feels equally like an outsider.
A more precise application of the agency principles of the state action doctrine
would have clarified who was responsible for the various aspects of each invocation,
thereby making it easier to tell whether the Court should have focused the Establish-
ment Clause inquiry on the prayers themselves or on the way Greece distributed the
right to offer an invocation.
B. Whose Speech, Which Speaker?
The Court has never provided a conceptual framework for attributing speech to the
government or to a private person.240 Most scholars considering the issue have proposed
that the Court create a special test that merges agency and substantive constitutional
values.241 This muddies the analytical waters and fails to safeguard the private exercise
of rights. The Court should apply ordinary agency principles with a close eye to
whether the government or a private speaker controls the content of the speech.
Robert Post has offered one of the most sophisticated approaches to government-
subsidized speech.242 His proposed analysis turns on the government’s objective—
whether the government is attempting to promote public discourse243 or its own ends.244
When the government attempts to promote public discourse, the Free Speech Clause
should protect the individual speaker from too much governmental interference.245
When the government is pursuing its own ends, the government should have more
leeway to impose conditions on government-subsidized speech and to discriminate
among content.246
The Court has never drawn the distinction that Post recommends, and it would
be difficult to maintain in practice. What if promoting public discourse is one among
several managerial goals of a government program? Such is probably the case with a
university’s limited public forum for student speech.247 As Post acknowledges else-
where, the university’s end, to some extent, is public discourse.248 More problematic
240 See Corbin, supra note 200, at 627.
241 See, e.g., id.
242 Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 152–53 (1996).
243 Id. at 154 (“The nature of First Amendment analysis, therefore, will depend on whether
or not speech is conceptualized as within the democratic domain of public discourse.”).
244 Id. at 164 (“Public discourse must be distinguished from domains that I have elsewhere
called ‘managerial,’ . . . [in which] the state organizes its resources so as to achieve specified
ends.”(citation omitted)); id. at 193.
245 Id. at 156.
246 Id.
247 Id. at 166 (discussing the difficulty of this distinction in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors
of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)).
248 MATTHEW FINKIN & ROBERT C. POST, FOR THE COMMON GOOD: PRINCIPLES OF
AMERICAN ACADEMIC FREEDOM 7–8 (2009).
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still is that Post’s approach merges the agency question with the substantive consti-
tutional question,249 giving more private speech rights to those who participate in
“public discourse” over those who participate in the government’s “managerial”
domain—even when the private speech may otherwise be protected as religious
exercise.250 A clearer approach would disentangle, rather than merge, the agency
question, the substantive constitutional questions, and the constitutional values that
the answers to those questions should approximate.
Caroline Mala Corbin’s proposal likewise submerges constitutional values by
commingling an agency and substantive constitutional analysis.251 In a close case,
the Court should give up trying to attribute responsibility to either a private speaker
or the government.252 Instead, the Court should conclude that the case involves
“mixed speech” and should apply intermediate scrutiny.253 Corbin’s proposal thus
splits the baby. Ordinary government speech and private speech would both be less
protected under intermediate scrutiny. Ordinarily the government may say what it
likes,254 and ordinarily the government may neither force private parties to say some-
thing255 nor regulate their speech on the basis of its content.256 As to religious speech
in particular, Corbin’s approach would dissolve the public and private distinction
between Establishment Clause prohibitions on the government’s religious speech
and First Amendment protections of private religious speech.257 As Corbin acknowl-
edges, her proposal would upend much free speech doctrine.258
A revolution is simply unnecessary. Corbin’s analytical device presumes that no
matter how many facts point in one direction, so long as one fact points in another,
249 See Post, supra note 242, at 156 (“[T]he categorization of the status of a speaker will
ordinarily be a very specific, context-bound judgment, informed by the particular First Amend-
ment considerations relevant to determining the boundaries of public discourse.”).
250 See id. at 166.
251 See Corbin, supra note 200, at 626–27.
252 See id. at 628.
253 See id. at 676.
254 See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 699 (1970) (iden-
tifying four potential limits on the government’s prerogative of speaking for itself); Helen
Norton, Not for Attribution: Government’s Interest in Protecting the Integrity of Its Own
Expression, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1317, 1349 (2004) (noting that the government is not
forced to support a speaker it disagrees with); Steven D. Smith, Why is Government Speech
Problematic?: The Unnecessary Problem, the Unnoticed Problem, and the Big Problem, 87
DENV. U. L. REV. 945, 949 (2010) (arguing that “the no viewpoint discrimination doctrine
does not apply when the governments are speaking”).
255 See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that
a state may not obligate schoolchildren to recite the pledge of allegiance).
256 See, e.g., Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (holding that
content restrictions on private speech are subject to strict scrutiny).
257 See Corbin, supra note 200, at 692.
258 See id. at 628 (“This definition [of mixed speech] cuts a wide swath and will signifi-
cantly change First Amendment jurisprudence.”).
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a decision in the first direction is unsound.259 The legal tradition relies on the opposite
assumption—that a court may exercise judgment to weigh and evaluate potentially
conflicting evidence case by case. Corbin is right that courts should apply neutral
criteria to the facts of a case to determine who is speaking.260 She is also right that
there are genuinely hard cases. But there is no need to abandon ordinary agency prin-
ciples in a vast array of speech cases.261 They are the most neutral legal principles
available because they do not depend upon hotly contested views of the meaning
and values underlying the First Amendment. And they are far more precise than
“intermediate scrutiny.”
Corbin’s proposal raises an important doctrinal question: For purposes of at-
tributing responsibility for speech—not for purposes of substantive constitutional
analysis—is it relevant whether a reasonable observer would attribute the speech to the
government?262 The Court has been somewhat equivocal about this.263 Under the “en-
dorsement” test, the question is relevant to determining whether the government has
violated the Establishment Clause.264 But it is unnecessary to bake the endorsement
259 Id. (“Speech may be mixed when . . . one factor points to a private speaker and another
to a government speaker, such as when the literal speaker is private but the government funds
the message . . . .”).
260 Cf. id. at 627 (suggesting five factors to help classify speech as private, governmental,
or mixed).
261 Corbin considers the following to be examples of “mixed speech”: art subsidized by the
government; religious speech in private schools that receive government funds; speech by private
individuals on government property; private advertisement on public transportation; student
articles in public school newspapers; private solicitation in a government charity drive; (often)
speech by government employees; “an invocation by a member of the clergy invited to a high
school graduation”; “postage stamps on private letters”; “vanity license plates”; “and
government ad campaigns that feature celebrity spokespeople.” Id. at 624–26, 626 n.113.
262 Corbin’s “five interrelated factors” are: “(1) Who is the literal speaker? (2) Who con-
trols the message? (3) Who pays for the message? (4) What is the context of the speech
(particularly the speech goals of the program in which the speech appears)? [and] (5) To
whom would a reasonable person attribute the speech?” Id. at 627; see also Norton, supra
note 254, at 1318–20 (asserting that the government “should be held responsible only for its
own views, and not those of others mistakenly attributed to it”).
263 Compare, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) (“In this
context the members of the listening audience must perceive the pregame message as a public
expression of the views of the majority of the student body delivered with the approval of the
school administration.”), with Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S.
753, 766 (1995) (“Private religious speech cannot be subject to veto by those who see
favoritism where there is none.”).
264 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(“Endorsement sends a message to non-adherents that they are outsiders, not full members
of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders,
favored members of the political community.”); see also County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil
Liberties Union of Greater Pittsburgh, 492 U.S. 573, 614–16 (relying on the endorsement test
to distinguish between the constitutionality of two religious displays), abrogated by Town
of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). Commentators have been critical of the test.
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question into the agency analysis to determine who is responsible for speech. In fact,
doing so tilts the analysis against the freedom of individual speech.
Suppose the ordinary agency principles apply. Under those principles, it does
not matter whether an observer would reasonably attribute some conduct to the
government. The government is not responsible for a robber impersonating a police
officer. Now suppose that there is a close case about religious speech. Observers
reasonably attribute the speech to the government, but the government has neither
exercised control over the speech nor authorized an agent to engage in the speech
on the government’s behalf. The government is not constitutionally responsible for
the speech. But the appearance of government responsibility may still have a role
to play in the substantive constitutional analysis. Perhaps the Establishment Clause
prohibits the government from permitting the private speech, or perhaps it requires
the government to engage in supplemental speech to make it clear to reasonable
observers who is speaking. Weighing against these establishment questions, how-
ever, are new questions about the speaker’s free speech and free exercise rights.
Those substantive questions, and their potential conflict with the Establishment Clause
question, emerge only when the endorsement test has not influenced the analysis
about who is actually responsible for the speech.
C. Ceremonial Public Prayer as a Very Limited Public Forum
In Town of Greece, the Court assumed that every aspect of the invocation prac-
tice was attributable to the town.265 Had the Court done an agency analysis instead,
the following would have been clearly attributable to the government: (1) choosing
to have invocations before town board meetings; (2) the procedure used to select a
chaplain of the month; and (3) the procedure for each invocation.266
By contrast, under an ordinary agency analysis, the content of each prayer was
attributable to the chaplain, not to the town.267 The town invited the chaplain to pray,
but put no restrictions on the content of her prayer.268 Unlike in Marsh,269 the town
did not select one clergy member of one Christian denomination and give him a
See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, What’s Right and Wrong with “No Endorsement,” 21 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 307, 307 (2006); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions:
Establishment Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 268 (1987)
(describing the “no endorsement” test as a “doctrinal dead end”). Justice Kennedy never en-
dorsed the test, and its survival is unclear. See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 674 (Kennedy,
J., concurring and dissenting) (“Either the endorsement test must invalidate scores of tradi-
tional practices recognizing the place religion holds in our culture, or it must be twisted and
stretched to avoid inconsistency with practices we know to have been permitted in the past,
while condemning similar practices with no greater endorsement effect simply by reason of
their lack of historical antecedent.”).
265 Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1827.
266 Id. at 1846–47 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
267 Id. at 1816 (majority opinion).
268 Id.
269 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 785 (1983).
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salary.270 Rather, the Greece chaplains represented a variety of theological traditions
within Christianity; the chaplains and other members of their traditions may or may
not consider themselves interchangeably “Christian.”271 Furthermore, unlike in
Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the town did not create a majoritarian
process for electing a “chaplain of the year.”272 The town invited every clergy member
with a congregation within the city limits, it never declined a chaplain’s request to
pray, and it never declined to reinvite a chaplain who had already offered an invoca-
tion.273 In short, the town showed no interest in, or control over, the particular content
of the prayers.274 All it cared about was having an invocation of some kind.275 The
chaplain was an agent for the generic purpose of an invocation, but was not an agent
for the purpose of any particular “sectarian” speech. As to the individual speech, the
facts uniformly suggest that the chaplain was on his or her own recognizance.276
The foregoing analysis has important implications. The Establishment Clause
questions do not vanish; rather, they are recast as questions about whether Greece’s
invitation procedure was fair and whether Greece was obligated to engage in supple-
mental speech to clarify its role.277
New constitutional questions, however, largely ignored by the Court, emerge.
What are the chaplains’ rights? Does the First Amendment prohibit Greece from dis-
criminating among chaplains based on their religious views? If so, does it place an
affirmative duty on Greece to include a wider range of religious views? Here we are
in uncharted constitutional waters. Perhaps courts would be well served by borrow-
ing some concepts from another context in which the government distributes a right
of private speech: the “limited public forum” doctrine.
At the outset, it is important to note the differences between ceremonial invoca-
tions and the ordinary application of the limited public forum doctrine. A “limited
public forum” is ordinarily a place, real or virtual, that the government voluntarily
makes available for a class of persons to engage in private speech.278 It is not ordinarily
a place where the government invites one person at a time to speak (although it may
be).279 The government may restrict the speech in a limited public forum to be sure
it reasonably relates to the government’s purpose in opening the forum, but the
270 Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1816.
271 Id.
272 See 530 U.S. 290, 291 (2000).
273 Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1816.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 Id. at 1818.
277 For further analysis, see infra Part III.D.2.
278 See Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 134 S. Ct. 2971, 2975 (2010); Good News Club
v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch.
Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 390 (1993).
279 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 303–04 (2000).
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government may not engage in “viewpoint discrimination.”280 Restricting a forum
to ceremonial invocations may be a reasonable way to solemnize the event, a per-
missible government purpose. But allowing only “invocations” is itself a form of
viewpoint discrimination. In ordinary language usage, an “invocation” presumes some
higher authority (divine or not) to which the invocation is addressed.281 Requiring
the private speech to be an “invocation” therefore discriminates against the religious
viewpoint that there is no higher authority, or no such authority that pays attention
to town board meetings. The town could attempt to extend the forum to nonreligious
“invocations” such as hortatory speeches of civic unity. But that would restrict the
viewpoint that the town is or should be disunified. Ceremonial invocations are a
square peg to the limited public forum doctrine’s round hole.282
Nevertheless, the limited public forum doctrine, I suggest, offers the best template
for guiding government invocation practices. The doctrine balances the government’s
interest in reasonable limits on government-subsidized speech and the individual
speaker’s free speech and free exercise interests in religious nondiscrimination. The
doctrine is one of the few that addresses not just negative rights, but constitutional
limits on the distribution of positive rights. In that respect, it aptly fits the scenario
where the government distributes liberty to engage in speech, albeit speech of a
peculiar kind—in this case, speech that is uniquely religious and political.
How do the “reasonably related” and “viewpoint neutral” tests translate to the
peculiar “forum” of ceremonial invocations? The “reasonably related” restriction
might provide some guidance about how the government may go about selecting
chaplains. Permitting only those who live in the jurisdiction to offer an invocation,
for instance, would be fairly analogous to permitting only university students and
staff to participate in a limited public forum on university property. That seems to
have been the underlying rationale for the Court’s consideration of whether Greece
was obligated to invite religious leaders from nearby Rochester to achieve more
diversity. A modified limited public forum analysis would make that reasonableness
requirement explicit.
What about restricting the chaplains to “clergy” as Greece did? This is arguably
unreasonable given the forum’s purpose of offering a ceremonial invocation—a
number of religious groups believe in prayer, but do not have clergy. And a number
of religious people who may want to offer an invocation are not part of an organized
religious group. The clergy restriction, therefore, is not a reasonable proxy for religious
sincerity, authority, or representation. To the extent the clergy requirement operates
to exclude chaplains on the basis of their religious viewpoint, the requirement also
would probably run afoul of the “viewpoint neutrality” requirement.
280 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829.
281 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 675 (1984).
282 Some also consider the doctrine incoherent. See Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial
Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REV. 581, 615 n.230 (2006).
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A prohibition on derogatory language about other religions would likely be rea-
sonable. Derogating another religious view is unnecessary for an invocation, and it is
likely to undermine the unity rationale of a ceremonial invocation by inflaming adher-
ents of the derogated religion. Distinguishing between a prayer that expressly dero-
gates other religions from one that merely vaunts the speaker’s religious beliefs is easy
enough: the former mentions another’s religious belief or tradition; the latter does not.
What could “viewpoint neutral” possibly mean when the forum itself is premised
on a “viewpoint”—either religious or political, or both? Perhaps the “viewpoint neu-
trality” requirement, translated into the context of ceremonial public prayer, would
require neutrality among religious viewpoints.283 The government may not discrimi-
nate on the basis of the chaplain’s religious views, including whether the chaplain
believes in God (or gods). A non-theistic hortatory speech that advances both civic re-
flection and unity would pass this test—Ralph Waldo Emerson made a career of it.
Greece seems to have complied with this standard. It invited clergy from Greece,
a reasonable limitation.284 It did not discriminate on the basis of the chaplain’s re-
ligious views.285 And besides an array of Christians, Greece has allowed a Jewish
Rabbi, a Wiccan, and an atheist to deliver invocations.286
The limited public forum doctrine is in many ways a poor fit for public invoca-
tions. But translating it for the Marsh framework, which appears to be here to stay,
would guide judicial review of the government’s authority to distribute the freedom
to lead ceremonial public prayers.
D. The Remaining Questions
The remaining questions are whether the Establishment Clause places affirma-
tive duties on the government when it invites people to offer a public invocation,
and, if so, what duties.
1. Religious Affirmative Action?
Does the Establishment Clause or perhaps the Equal Protection Clause require
a town board to engage in religious affirmative action to ensure that the chaplains,
and therefore the invocations, reflect a wider array of religious traditions? Greece
had a facially non-discriminatory selection policy and did not deny any volunteer the
opportunity to deliver an invocation.287 But Greece’s selection process limited the
range of religious traditions represented by the chaplains, and, until others spoke up,
all of them were Christian.288
283 Good News Club, 533 U.S. 98 (holding that denying access to a club based on its
religious viewpoint ran afoul of viewpoint neutrality).
284 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1816 (2014).
285 Id. at 1840 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
286 Id. at 1817 (majority opinion).
287 Id. at 1816.
288 Id. at 1816–17.
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Under the limited public forum doctrine, the government may not discriminate
against speakers based on their viewpoint, but it has no affirmative obligation to ensure
counter-speech within the forum or to make sure that every viewpoint is represented.289
Perhaps the Establishment Clause, which articulates a particular evil for the govern-
ment to avoid, puts a higher burden on the government than the Free Speech Clause
does.290 Scholars and courts could reasonably disagree about these questions.
The Establishment Clause may place a modest affirmative duty on governments
to guarantee that everyone who wants to participate in public invocations has an
equal opportunity to know about that opportunity and to take it.291 But who should
be responsible for articulating and policing this duty? I am dubious that the courts’
attempt to enforce this duty would yield net constitutionality. It runs the risk of de-
volving into innumerable disputes over trivial minutiae. (For instance, how many
plastic reindeer and talking wishing wells in a town’s holiday display are sufficient
to balance out a crèche?292) In my view, governments ought to proactively seek to
avoid the appearance of religious allegiance, but the primary doctrinal check should
be a prohibition on facial religious discrimination, not an affirmative duty to eliminate
unequal participation by private speakers.
2. A Duty of Supplemental Speech?
Another difficult Establishment Clause question is whether the government,
when the provenance of religious speech is unclear, is obligated to clarify that the
speech is a private party’s, not the government’s. Some have suggested this approach
in cases that present a close question on whether the government or a private party
is responsible for the speech at issue.293 In Rosenberger, the Court emphasized the
importance for its analysis that the government required forum participants to declare
that they were speaking for themselves, and not for the government.294 In addition,
the Establishment Clause standard that the government should not be perceived as
endorsing a religious belief suggests that even when the government allows private
289 See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L.
REV. 695, 701 (2011) (arguing that the government speech “defense” might be available for
viewpoint discrimination when the government “affirmatively provides equal alternatives for
private speakers against whose viewpoints it has discriminated”).
290 See Jason E. Manning, Comment, Good News Club v. Milford Central School: View-
point Discrimination or Endorsement of Religion?, 28 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 833, 848 (2003)
(noting the Court’s “tendency to find a Free Speech Clause violation claim while denying
the parallel Establishment Clause defense”).
291 See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1818 (noting the lower court’s opinion that Greece
might have avoided the issue if it had advertised the invocation opportunity more widely).
292 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 695 n.1 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
293 See, e.g., Norton, supra note 254, at 1332–33.
294 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834–35 (1995).
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religious speech, it may be responsible for failing to ensure that observers would not
attribute that speech to the government.295
Affirmative duties are rare in constitutional law, but I think the Establishment
Clause principle that the government should not engage in religious favoritism is
clear enough, and well-entrenched enough, in our law to justify a governmental duty
to clarify whether religious speech is the government’s or a private individual’s.296
Disavowals are relatively easy to make, and they are easy to investigate and enforce.
In cases like Greece, a disavowal would merely put a fine point on the government’s
involvement: the government endorses ceremonial public invocations, but it does not
endorse any particular theological viewpoint.
IV. RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION STATUTES
The Establishment Clause requirements for statutory religious accommodations,
like the one in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,297 is another doctrinal area that
would benefit from reframing the question to focus on the government’s distribution
of religious liberty. The Supreme Court’s inconsistent approach to religious accom-
modation statutes has produced one of “the most vexed questions in the law of the
religion clauses.”298 Although the Court has invalidated a couple of religious ac-
commodation statutes for violating the Establishment Clause,299 it has upheld or applied
without question many others.300 Accordingly, the Court has neither articulated nor
applied a clear substantive principle that would guide lawmakers and courts seeking
to provide religious accommodations without violating the Establishment Clause.
Governments and advocates are left to divine such a principle from the few cases on
point, from prior history, or from broader constitutional values.
The distribution principle would help courts and scholars distinguish between the
conduct for which the government is constitutionally responsible when it enacts and
enforces a religious accommodation statute, and the conduct that is rightly attributed to
295 See supra notes 287–89 and accompanying text.
296 See supra note 264.
297 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
298 GREENAWALT, supra note 39, at 336.
299 Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 17–25 (1989); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,
Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 708–11 (1985).
300 See, e.g., Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
437–38 (2006) (applying the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to a group that uses otherwise
illegal drugs in worship); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 726 (2005) (upholding the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act); Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S.
327, 334–40 (1987) (upholding an exemption for religious nonprofits from Title VII’s rule
against religious discrimination in employment); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333,
335–67 (1970) (construing the draft exemption for religious objectors broadly to include
nonreligious objectors); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 676–80 (1970) (upholding tax
exemptions for religious organizations).
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private religious exercise. This distinction will hopefully pave the way for a more pre-
cise and fruitful discussion among courts and scholars about what the proper Establish-
ment Clause principles ought to be, and how they ought to apply in any given case.
The Supreme Court has debated whether the results of religious accommodations
are attributable to the government or to the religious exercise of a private party.301 For
instance, in Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, the Court unanimously con-
cluded that the Establishment Clause permits a statutory exemption from Title VII’s
religious discrimination prohibition for religious nonprofits, even when the job at
issue is “secular.”302 Along the way, the Justices bickered about who was responsible
for the burden on employees—the government for authorizing the religious discrim-
ination303 or the employer for engaging in it.304 The answer is obviously crucial. If
the government is responsible, the Court must decide whether the Constitution
prohibits the government from creating such a burden on the basis of the private
exercise of religion. If a private party is responsible, then the Constitution is silent
with respect to the result of any given private employment decision. The question
instead would be whether the Establishment Clause prohibits the government’s dis-
tribution of a private right to discriminate on the basis of religion, not whether the
Establishment Clause prohibits the particular discrimination at issue.
Is a private party who exercises religion pursuant to a legal accommodation a
state actor? Put this way, at least, it does not seem like a difficult question. Religious
accommodation statutes by definition exempt regulated parties from an obligation
to pursue the government’s regulatory goals so that they can pursue their own reli-
gious interest. They are not government agents.
Why, then, did the Court bicker over this issue in Corporation of Presiding
Bishop?305 Perhaps because the Justices were struggling to understand the relation-
ship between the government’s distribution of religious liberty and private exercise,
but lacked the conceptual tools to do so. The government is not constitutionally
responsible for the specific burdens that someone’s religious exercise places on a
third party, but it is certainly responsible for the distribution of religious liberty that
301 See Steven D. Smith, Debate, The Constitutional Mandate and Religious Freedom, 161
U. PA. L. REV. 261, 271 (2013).
302 483 U.S. at 338–40.
303 Id. at 340 n.1 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“An exemption by its nature merely permits
certain behavior, but that has never stopped this Court from examining the effect of exemptions
that would free religion from regulations placed on others.”); see, e.g., id. at 347 (O’Connor,
J., concurring) (explaining that because of the exemption, “[t]he Church had the power to put
[the employee] to a choice of qualifying for a temple recommend or losing his job because
the Government had lifted from religious organizations the general regulatory burden imposed
by [Title VII].”(emphasis added)); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Walz, 397 U.S. at 669.
304 Corp. of Presiding Bishop, 483 U.S. at 337 n.15.
305 See generally id.
450 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 24:405
allowed those burdens in the first place. When the Court writes that a law authorizes
private parties to place burdens on others, it is not saying that the law deputizes them
to do so. Rather, the law allows them to do so. An accommodation does not make
an agent of the religious exerciser. A religious accommodation is neither more nor
less than a governmental distribution of religious liberty. Hopefully, this clarifica-
tion offered by the distribution principle will help courts and scholars develop prin-
ciples for determining whether a given distribution of religious liberty violates the
Establishment Clause.
CONCLUSION
In the United States, religion and public life have always been entwined. The
Establishment Clause was never intended to keep religion out of the public square.
Those who enter that square carry their religious commitments with them. And that
is precisely as it should be: the Religion Clauses complement one another, ensuring
that the religion that affects our shared life arises from private exercise, and not from
the government. To enforce that principle, courts must have a better tool for distin-
guishing between governmental and private conduct. This Article has argued that
a reformed concept of the state action doctrine that applies the Constitution to distri-
butions of private rights clarifies existing Establishment Clause doctrine and safeguards
private religious liberty.
